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Insider dealing is detrimental to a fair market since insider dealers use special 
information obtained from their privileged positions to trade and to take advantage of 
the general investing public. It undermines the market integrity and investor's 
confidence in Hong Kong as a well-regulated financial centre. 
The Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance was enacted to combat 
circumstances where insiders such as directors and substantial shareholders use 
confidential information to make personal gain from the trade. In order to effectively 
monitor their trading activities, the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 
requires these connected persons to notify the company and the Stock Exchange of their 
interests in shares of a listed company as well as subsequent changes. 
Both regulations came in force eight years ago in 1991. This paper will discuss 
their adequacy in maintaming a transparent market in Hong Kong and protection of 
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The securities market has gained a prominent role in global finances. There 
has been an increasing number of corporations raise funds through listing. 
Institutional and private investors also place more and more money into securities 
market. As at January 1999，there are 680 listed companies in Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong is the fourth largest securities market in Asia with a capitalisation of US$316 
billion1. It ranks next to Tokyo(US$2,246bil), Osaka (US$l，721bil) and Australia 
(US$347bil). 
The variety and complexity of securities products increases with this growing 
enthusiasm to the market. In times when the market was bullish before the Asian 
Currency Crisis, there was huge influx of institutional and private investors in the 
local market. Unfortunately, many small investors have limited knowledge on the 
securities and most trades are speculative in nature and rumours driven. The huge 
participation by the public did not transform Hong Kong to a mature market, if not on 
the contrary. Unusual trading activities, large fluctuation in share prices, 
unconfirmed market rumours were nearly norms of the days. 
1 SEHK, Regional Monitor Issue No. 21 
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Securities regulators are armed with the responsibility to maintain a well-
regulated market that protects the interests of investors. In 1997，the Securities and 
Futures Commission ['SFC'] successfully prosecuted eight persons and companies for 
illegal activities such as unregistered dealing, short selling and unlicensed foreign 
exchange trading2. The number of prosecution increased by more than four times to 
thirty-four in 1998. Among these successful cases, two in 1997 and three in 1998 are 
related to the contravention of Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance. 
The importance of improving market regulation has rarely been so laudable, 
when the stock market collapsed from its all-time high in late 1997 and the investing 
public and practitioners suffered unfathomable losses. What kind of regulation 
should be in place to create a healthier market? 
SFC, Enforcement Actions, http://www.hksfc.org.hk/eng/enforce/intro.htm 
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Objective of Securities Regulations 
An effective regulatory framework is fundamental to the soundness of the 
securities market. International Organisation of Securities Commissions ['IOSCO'] 
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has identified three core objectives of securities regulations : 
(1) The protection of investors 
(2) Ensuring the markets are fair, efficient and transparent 
(3) The reduction of systemic risk 
The Protection of Investors 
Regulations should ensure that investors are provided with sufficient 
information for making informed investment decisions. Market manipulation, false 
and misleading statements and insider dealings are examples where listed companies 
and their insiders use price sensitive information to make profit. To this end, there 
should be full disclosure requirements on them and a mechanism to monitor their 
trading activities. 
Securities trading are taking on a global perspective and its participants are no 
longer limited to local investors. In order to preserve market integrity and to 
effectively monitor cross border trading, regulators should align domestic disclosure, 
accounting and auditing requirements with international standards. 
3 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulations’ 1998 
.4 
Regulators should also ensure market intermediaries treat investors in a fair 
manner. There should be comprehensive inspection, surveillance and compliance 
programmes in place, as well as minimum standard on code of conduct and business 
ethics on practitioners. 
Most important of all, securities regulators should be vested with sufficient 
power to enforce the securities law. Most fraudulent or prohibited transactions are 
structurally complex and legal proceedings are resources intensive. It is unlikely that 
general investors would have comparable capability to take action against the 
wrongdoers. Regulators should take appropriate action to protect the interests of 
investors. 
Ensuring that Markets are Fair, Efficient and Transparent 
Regulations should aim to prevent improper and unfair market practices. All 
participants are treated equally and there is no favouritism towards a special group. 
Any attempt to contravene the law should be detected and penalised. 
Regulators should promote a transparent trading environment and establish an 
effective mechanisms to provide investors with fair access to market and price 
information In particular, information should be timely disseminated to the general 
public and be truly reflected in prices of the securities. 
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The Reduction of Systemic Risk 
Regulators should closely supervise market intermediaries to ensure that they 
meet capital adequacy and prudential requirements. They should also promote the 
adoption of risk management policies in intermediaries. Appropriate steps should be 
taken to evaluate and monitor investment risk on an ongoing fashion. 
In addition, as there are more and more cross border investments, regulators of 
different jurisdictions should cooperate and share information. 
Regulatory Framework of the Hong Kong Securities Market 
SFC was established by the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance in 
1989 as an independent statutory body. The two main roles of SFC are protection of 
investors and encouraging the development of Hong Kong securities market. It 
administers nine principal Ordinances: SFC Ordinance, Securities Ordinance, 
Commodities Trading Ordinance, Stock Exchange Unification Ordinance, Securities 
and Futures (Clearing House) Ordinance, Protection of Investors Ordinance, 
Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance, Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading 
Ordinance and Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance. In addition, the SFC issues 
regulations and guidelines to supplement these statutory instruments. 
The SFC also supervises the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Future 
Exchange, clearing houses and financial intermediaries. These self-regulatory bodies 
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are responsible to ensure that market integrity is maintained and proper practices are 
upheld by their members. 
Objective of This Study 
The objective of this study is to review the adequacy of our regulations to 
achieve the objective of establishing a fair and transparent market in Hong Kong. In 
this respect, the disclosure regime and prohibition of insider dealing are identified as 
the main areas of interests. 
This paper will compare the Hong Kong Securities (Disclosure of Interests) 
Ordinance arid Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance with the corresponding 
legislation in Singapore, namely Companies Act and Securities Industry Act. Major 
differences will be highlighted and reviewed if they reflect inadequacy in our 
regulations. Meeting international standards is the central theme of this paper. 
Finally, this paper will suggest some areas that are in need of improvement. 
7 
Methodology 
This study will mainly compare (1) Hong Kong Securities (Disclosure of 
Interests) Ordinance and Singapore Companies Act; (2) Hong Kong Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Ordinance and Singapore Securities Industry Act. On selected 
items，comparison will also be made with other major securities market such as US, 
UK, Australia and Malaysia to illustrate the differences. This study will also discuss 
some of the proposed amendments to Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 




DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS 
Development of Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 
in Hong Kong 
After the global market crash in 1987, the Government commissioned the 
Securities Review Committee to conduct a review on the Hong Kong securities 
market and its regulations. Findings of the Committee was published in the Hay 
Davison Report which was issued in May 1988. The report called for a number of 
regulatory reforms in Hong Kong. Among its recommendations, adequacy of 
disclosure requirements was highlighted as a major area in need of improvement so as 
to establish a fair and transparent market. 
The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Cap 396) [’SDIO'] came 
into force in 1991. It requires: 
1, person who holds more than 10% of the voting shares of a corporation listed 
on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong to disclose such shareholdings within 
five days, as well as subsequent changes in his shareholdings which is more 
than 1%. 
2. shareholders of listed companies to provide information on their shareholdings 
upon demand by the company. 
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3. directors and chief executives to disclose their shareholdings in a company 
and associated company. 
4. the Financial Secretary may appoint inspectors to conduct investigation on 
possible breach of disclosure duty. Person who fails to comply with this 
Ordinance will be penalised. 
This Ordinance was amended in 1991 to cover three major changes. First, the 
application of SDIO was extended to listed companies that are incorporated overseas. 
Secondly, the SFC may, after consulting the Financial Secretary, publish guidelines 
for the exemption of any listed company from all or any of the provisions of this 
Ordinance. Thirdly, freezing order on shares was applicable to locally incorporated 
companies only. There has been no major amendments on the Ordinance since 1991. 
Disclosure of Interests in Shares 
When Disclosure is Required? 
Section 3 of SDIO sets out the general circumstances that a person comes 
under the duty of disclosure. A person should disclose his shareholding if he holds 
more than 10% of the share capital of a listed company4 and any subsequent changes 
of more than the same percentage in his shareholding5. SDIO also applies to director, 
4S6(l) 
5 SDIO, S4(5Xb) 
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chief executive of a listed company and their families who hold shares in the 
company or its associated company . 
Furthermore, when two or more persons enter into an agreement to acquire 
• 7 
shares of a target company, each party is under the duty of disclosure , 
In Singapore, the duty of disclosure is stipulated in the Companies Act ['CA'] 
applies to both private and public companies. Listed companies are further required 
by the Corporate Disclosure Policy8 to disseminate material information to the public 
timely. The trigger percentage of substantial shareholding in Singapore is 5%, and it 
is two times lower than the 10% limit in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the CA does not 
provide a definite interpretation on 'change in interests'. A substantial shareholder 
that acquires or disposes voting shares in the company is deemed to have a change in 
Q 
interests and should notify the company within the required timeframe. 
Who Should Disclose? 
Under SDIO，substantial shareholders, directors and chief executives are 
under the obligation of disclosure . In order to avoid the loophole of layering 
shareholding through family members, they should disclose if their spouse and any 
child of them under the age of 18 years has an interest in the company11. If a company 
has a substantial interest in another company, and a person controls one-third of the 
6 SDIO, s28(2) 
7 SDIO, sl0(4) 
8 SES Listing Manual, Chapter 12 
9 CA, s83(3) 
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voting power of the former company, the person should also disclose his interest in 
that company12. 
In Singapore, substantial shareholders and directors have different duties of 
disclosure. Substantial shareholder is not required to report interests hold by his 
immediate family members. He is also not required to disclose ownership in 
subsidiary or associated companies, probably because the Act already requires 
shareholder to file this information separately with each company that he owns. On 
the other hand, a director faces more stringent disclosure requirement and he is 
• • 13 
deemed to have an interest if it is held by his spouse or child . 
The duty of disclosure arises when a person knows that he acquires or 
disposes an notifiable interest in shares of a listed company，or when there is any 
change in his shareholding. In Singapore, it is a defence if the person can prove that 
he does not have knowledge of his interest on the date of summon or, only aware in 
less than 7 days before the date of summon14. Such defence is not available in SDIO. 
10 Please refer to Appendix 1-3 for the current disclosure notice forms 
11 SDIO, s8(l)ands31(l) 
12 SDIO, s8(2) 
13 CA, 164(5) 
14 CA, s90(l) 
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To Whom It should be Disclosed? 
The SDIO requires notification to be made to the listed company and the 
Exchange15, and that the Exchange should receive this notification before the listed 
company16. If the listed company is a financial institution, the company should also 
11 
notify the Hong Kong Monetary Authority . Notification should be made in writing 
within 5 days18 
This mechanism provides the public with two channels to access this 
information. First, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong will publish this information in 
newspaper and in its website upon receipt1 Also, every listed company shall keep a 
register20 and inscribe information into the register within 3 days21 of receiving the 
notification. This register is open to public for inspection without charge. 
In Singapore, the substantial shareholder shall notify only the company 
concerned " within two days�Notification to the Exchange or MAS is not required. 
« OA 
Similar to Hong Kong, the company should keep a register for public inspection , 
and any person may require the company to furnish a copy of its register. The 
company shall deliver such copy within 7 days. This time frame is shorter than the 10 
days requirement in Hong Kong. 
15 SDIO, s 17(2) and s32(2) 
16 SDIO, s7(l)(b)(ii) and paragraph 14(3) of Part D of the Schedule to the Ordinance 
17 SDIO, sl7(3) and s32(3) 
18 SDIO, S7(l)(a) and paragraph 13(1) of Part D of the Schedule to the Ordinance 
19 SDIO, sl7(2) 
20 SDIO, sl6(l) and s29(l) 
21 SDIO, sl6(3) 
22 CA, s 8 2 � 
23 CA, s82(2) 
24 CA, s88(l) 
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Directors, on the other hand, should notify the company within 24 hours and 
in case his directorship related to a listed company, he should also notify the 
Exchange within the same period26. The Exchange may publish such information. 
Penalty 
Non-compliance with the disclosure requirement is a criminal offence in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. 
In Hong Kong, if a company fails to keep its register properly, the company 
and its concerned officers are liable to a fine of HK$2,000 and a further fine of 
HKS200 per day if the olfence persists • A much heavier penalty will be imposed if 
a person fails to submit notification promptly or submits a false statement. He will be 
subject to a maximum fine of HK$100,000 and to imprisonment for 2 years • 
In addition, where a company is guilty of an offence under section 15(3), 
24(3)，28(8), 31(6), 42(3) or 45(1) resulting from negligence by its officers, the 
officers as well as the company are guilty and can be punished accordingly29, 
In Singapore, failure to give notices to the company as required under sections 
82,83,84 or 86 is an offence. The person is liable to a fine not exceeding S$5s000 and 
25 CA, 165(2) 
26 CA, sl66(a) 
27 SDIO, sl6(10) and s30(7) 
28 SDIO, s24(3), 28(8), s31(6) 
29 SDIO, s48(l) 
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a further fine of S$500 per day if the offence continues30. The same penalty also 
applies to non-compliance with s91 as discussed below. In this regard, non-
compliance with disclosure requirement is considered as a more serious offence in 
Hong Kong since the person can be subject to imprisonment. 
The Financial Secretary may make a restriction order on shares or order the 
sale of shares. When a restriction order is placed on the shares, those shares cannot 
be transferred, cancelled or removed. Where the shares are unissued, the company is 
not allowed to issue these shares or to transfer the right that will be issued with 
them . In addition, any agreement to transfer the shares or rights of shares is void . 
Person who fails to comply with Section 44 is liable to a fine of HK$ 10,000 and to 
imprisonment for 6 months. The Court of First Instance or the Financial Secretary 
may, on application, order the sale of these shares or the removal of such restriction. 
Company Investigation 
In Hong Kong, a listed company may request a person to provide information 
on his interest in share if the company believes that this person has an interest in its 
shares m the past 3 years . Person who fails to notify or provides false statement is 
liable on summary conviction to a fine of HK$ 10,000 and on conviction upon 
indictment to a fine of HKS 100,00034. 
30 CA, s89 
31 SDIO, s44(l) 
32 SDIO, s44(2) 
33 SDIO, si 8 
34 SDIO，s24(3) 
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Similar provisions are available in CA. In addition, it entrusts the company 
35 
with additional power to identify the ultimate beneficial owner of its shares . The 
company can request any of its members to disclose whether he holds any voting 
shares of the company as beneficial owner or as trustee. In the latter case, the 
company can further require him to advise the ultimate beneficial owner of these 
shares. A person who fails to comply with this section or makes false statement shall 
be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 
S$10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years. 
Regulatory Investigation 
The Financial Secretary may appoint an investigator to conduct an 
investigation so as to determine the true person who controls the company • The 
inspector is empowered to request officers to produce all books and documents and to 
attend hearings . Those who fails to cooperate can be punished by the Court of First 
Instance as if he has been guilty of contempt of the Court 8. Upon completion of the 
investigation, the inspector will submit a report to the Financial Secretary 9. The 
Financial Secretary may also request a person to provide information on owner of 
shares40. 
35 CA, s92 
36 SDIO, s33(l) 
37 SDIO, s36(l) 
38 SDIO, s38(3) 
39 SDIO, s39(l) 
40 SDIO, s42(l) 
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If relevant facts about any shares cannot be identified, the Financial Secretary 
may place restriction order on shares of this company41. For instance, in 1993，Asia 
Securities Ltd and Quatro Enterprises Ltd sold a total of 60,000,000 shares in ASIL to 
Wong Sheu Chui. The Financial Secretary ordered an investigation on the 
membership of Asia Securities International Ltd (ASIL) to determine the persons who 
control its policy. 
In 1992, the Financial Secretary ordered an investigation under si43 of 
Companies Ordinance on whether there was a breach on the Hong Kong Code of 
Takeovers in the placement of 419million shares of the World Trade Centre Group 
Ltd to 14 placees. He also ordered an investigation under s33 of SDIO to determine 
persons who were financially interested in the company or controlled its policy. 
However, ownership of a total of 9.8% shares held by three nominee companies 
incorporated in the British Virgin Island remained unidentified. The Financial 
Secretary subsequently made a restriction order on these shares pursuant to s41 of 
SDIO. The objective of this order was to force the disclosure of the true identity of 
the shareowner. 
In 1993, the group received a takeover offer from Rovtec Investment Ltd for 
all its share at a price of HKSL96 per share. Shareholders were positive to the offer 
and applied to seek a court order for the sale of its frozen shares. The court finally 
granted an order to sell the frozen shares. In reaching this judgement, the court 
considered that (1) It was in the public interest to sell these shares; (2) Adequate steps 
had been taken to identify the ultimate shareholder; (3) Shares had been blocked for a 
41 SDIO, s41(l) 
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significant period of time without any result; and (4) A thorough investigation had 
been conducted on the company and further investigation ordered by the Court is 
unnecessaiy. 
Investigation power in Singapore42 is similar to Hong Kong. The Minister of 
Finance may apply to the Court for orders restraining the disposal of his shares and 
the exercise of rights attached to shares. The Court may also make an order 
prohibiting the payment of shares, directing the sale of shares, or directing the 
company not to register the transfer of specific shares. 
In terms of judicial power on restriction order, the regulation in Hong Kong is 
more stringent as it extends to imissued shares and contravention of this provision 
may result in imprisonment. 
Commentary 
Some of the requirements of SDIO are comparatively loose43. In this regard, 
SFC issued a Consultation Paper on Amendments to the Securities (Disclosure of 
Interests) Ordinance ['Consultation Paper'] on 30th June 1998 and proposed a number 
of changes to improve market transparency. The Consultation paper was concluded 
th 
on 30 September. SFC has incorporated the public comments and issued a 
consultation conclusion on March 199944 In the following part of this section, we 
42 CA, s91(l) 
抖 Please refer to Appendix 4 for a comparison for disclosure requirements between HK and Singapore 
Please refer to Appendix 5 for the proposed initial substantial shareholder notice and Appendix 6 for a 
summary of the Consultation Paper. 
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will review some of the proposed changes by the SFC with respect to the above 
discussions on Singapore. 
Reduce Disclosure Threshold to 5% 
The current disclosure level of 10% is not only high comparing to Singapore, 
it is also the highest in major international markets. With the exceptions of Malaysia 
(2%) and UK (3%)，the disclosure level is 5% in Australia, Japan, Indonesia, US, 
New Zealand, Thailand and PRC45. Reducing the disclosure threshold to 5% is a 
significant step towards international standard. This threshold was first been 
suggested in the Hay Davison Report in 1988 based on the following considerations: 
‘(a) 5% fall in line with international standards; 
(b) 10% of a company's capital in Hong Kong is likely to be a much higher 
percentage of the free float then in other countries and consequently 10% of the 
free float wields a disproportionate amount of influence to its size; 
(c) 10% makes it too easy for large investors to hide significant shareholdings and 
consequently to conceal their dealings in those shares; and 
(d) 5% would be more effective in stamping out material insider trading.'46 
This alignment with international standard is particularly important with the 
increasing cross-border transactions facilitated by new technologies. It essentially 
eliminates a loophole where global investors can take advantage of jurisdiction 
:SFC, Consultation Paper on the amendments of SDIO published on 30th June 1998 ppP 
Paragraph 12.13, Hay Davison Report at pp.316-317 ’ “ 
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differences. More important, it can improve market transparency and allow the 
regulators to spot unusual trading pattern at an earlier stage. It will also provide more 
information that is useful to the regulators in enforcing its other duties, such as the 
identification of insider dealing. The effect is an overall improvement in the level of 
market supervision. 
Timeliness of Disclosure 
In Hong Kong, notification should be completed within 5 days. It is three days 
more than Singapore and also more than most of the other jurisdictions47 including 
UK (2 days), PRC (3 days), Thailand (1 day), Australia (2 days) and New Zealand 
(immediate). The original proposal suggested to reduce the notification period to two 
days so as to improve market transparency. However, the public is not supportive of 
this proposal Major problems they perceived are the time zone differences and the 
complicated shareholding structure of worldwide corporations. The' SFC counter-
proposed to reduce the period to three days in order to align with the requirement of 
Mainland China. This change will nevertheless put our disclosure regime closer to 
the international counterparts. 
In addition, the SFC proposed to remove the requirement that notification 
should be filed with the Exchange prior to the Company. The existing requirement is 
impractical, since filings are usually handled by the company secretaries and 
therefore has technically breached the regulation in practice. 
47 Supra n3 8 
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Disclosure of Change in Interest 
Current regulation requires substantial shareholders to notify when there is a 
change in interests to a different percentage level. This measurement may not 
produce a meaningful representation of the actual change in shareholding. For 
instance, a change in 0.99% (from 11% to 11.99%) may be exempted from the 
notification requirement but a change of merely 0.4% (from 11.7% to 12.1%) may 
not The SFC therefore proposed to change the rule from ‘same percentage level，to 
'change less than 0.5% across a percentage level'. 
The current proposal has the advantage of providing a more well-defined basis 
to measure the change in interests. However, the measurement itself seems quite 
complicated and the compilation of which will be time consuming. It will 
inadvertently increase the compliance burden of company secretaries. It is often 
argued that much resources has been spent on compliance reporting which are in fact 
counter-productive. For many medium-sized companies, detailed information 
required by the regulators are not available in the computer system. Reports are 
compiled manually. Furthermore, additional time is required to satisfy additional 
requirements. It poses another difficulty to reduce the notification period. 
There is no easy answer to the conflict between cost and benefit of an 
enhanced disclosure system. Yet, we are fortunate that our disclosure requirement is 
still simpler than a number of other countries like Singapore, which requires directors 
to disclose any change in interests within twenty-four hours. 
.21 
Details of Registered Shareholder 
In an attempt to remove onerous compliance burden, the SFC proposed to 
exempt substantial shareholders from notifying changes in particulars of each 
registered shareholders. Despite many countries, including Singapore, still adopt this 
practice, the regulator considers that this change will not reduce market transparency 
since the company is still required to maintain this register which is subject to public 
inspection. Also, most shares are registered in the name of HKSCC Nominees and 
changes in interest will not change the registered shareholder. 
Disclosure of Considerations and Agreements 
Such requirement is not available in Singapore. This requirement can spot 
collective purchase of securities that aims to interfere share price movements. The 
SFC further proposed substantial shareholder to disclose considerations in acquiring 
or disposing interests in shares either on or off the exchange. However, it seems 
difficult to ensure and check its compliance in practice. Most commercial 
agreements are confidential in nature and are not lodged with any statutory body. It is 
questionable how SFC can ascertain the existence of such agreement prior to an 
investigation By then, the knowledge of it would be retrospective. This requirement 
relies on voluntary disclosure by the shareholder and the information provided can 
hardly be verified. In other words, the effectiveness of its improving market 
transparency is susceptible. 
.22 
Shareholding Structure of Corporate Substantial Shareholder48 
The problem of corporate interest is that a company is a separate legal entity 
and it holds its own assets rather than on behalf of the shareholder. Thus, if a private 
company A wholly-owned a listed company B，a substantial shareholder who holds 
75% of company A does not hold an equivalent of 75% of company B and is not a 
substantial shareholder of company B. If company B is held by several private 
companies and each of these companies holds less than 10% of company B，a 
shareholder can easily shield his true shareholdings in both companies. 
In Singapore, both listed and unlisted companies are under the duty of 
disclosure. This requirement is onerous and ineffective since many private 
companies are unconnected with the listed ones. This notification requirement 
simply creates piles of reports that are mostly irrelevant to public interests. 
In Hong Kong, shareholding of many family owned companies are split into 
small parcels and held by unlisted companies owned by family members. By doing 
so, the substantial shareholders can hide their true shareholding. Shares are held by 
nominee or offshore companies that are exempted from the disclosure requirement. 
To improve market transparency, it is proposed that notification should include 
person who holds more than 10% interest in a substantial shareholder's share capital. 
This proposal was revised after public consultation. If a company is a substantial 
shareholder of a listed company, the notification should state particulars of its 
48 SFC，Consultation on the Amendments to the SDIO, 30th June 1998, pp23-26 
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controllers. So long as the listed company act independently from its parent company, 
disclosure by controllers of parent company is not required. 
Recommendations 
Details of Disclosure 
The regulator should ensure that adequate and appropriate information is 
disclosed to the public. The basis of judgement is that the information should be 
useful and understandable for the public to make investment decision. In most cases, 
information needed by the public can be very different from those of regulators. 
Regulators are equipped with the knowledge to interpret technical terminology and 
the additional duty of market surveillance. Some of the existing requirements, such 
as disclosing particulars of substantial shareholder, are clearly of low interest to the 
public. The disclosure mechanism has generated piles of data that has little effect on 
improving market transparency, at least from the perspective of general investors. 
Disclosure requirements should align with the spirit of disclosure. The SFC 
should continue to abandon the outdated and redundant provisions. Regulators should 
avoid the situation where 'The information we have is not what we want; The 
information we want is not what we need; the information we need is not available.，49 
SFC should continue to simplify information disclosed to the public. 
49 Finagle's Law cited in (1975) 63 Harvard Business Review 106 
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Compliance Burden 
The essence of the disclosure regime is to identify the person who has the 
power to control the company. However, many of the current requirements do not 
seem to achieve this objective. For example, the requirement that notification must 
be made to the Exchange before it is made to the company and the proposed 
disclosure of consideration and terms of agreement. Some of the provisions are 
obsolete and pointless, or requires substantial corporate resources to compile the 
information required. The result is creation of additional and unnecessary 
compliance burden, while these resources can produce more meaningful information. 
As the SFC noted in its Consultation Paper, they should consider 'the cost of 
complying with additional disclosure requirement and the potential risk of providing 
excess information to the market.'50 It is a difficult task. Nevertheless, SFC should 
pay more attention to the business viability and avoid the danger of becoming a 
bureaucratic agency. 
Definition of Terms 
There is a trend of interpretation and re-interpretation of the terms of 
provisions as regulators discover that market players use loose definitions to their 
advantage. It is nearly impossible to nail down a term to one single meaning, and any 
attempt to do so is fruitless. It results in an increasing complicated legislature which 
is difficult to be understood. This seems to go hand in hand with the additional 
disclosure details, most of which are beyond public comprehension. 
50 SFC, Consultation on the Amendments to the SDIO, 30th June 1998，pp4 
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As the regulator promotes the use of plain language in prospectus, this same 
approach should apply here. To illustrate, the Singapore Companies Act is written in 
simple English and is much easier to understand. 
International Standards 
Several provisions of the SDIO are outdated. For example, the notification 
threshold of 10% lags behind our international counterparts by some 10 years. Most 
countries develop their own disclosure requirements based on the US or Australia 
model. They have also added some local ingredients to fit its domestic operations. 
Nonetheless, meeting international standards is an important fact that local regulators 
should not ignore. Being a major international financial centre, our legislation and 
legal framework should develop towards the global direction. 
Many law reform bodies, such as Australia, Singapore and PRC, have been 
keeping a watchful eye on development in overseas jurisdictions. SFC also recognises 
the importance of meeting international standards, and has incorporated some 
breakthrough changes in its latest proposal. Unfortunately, the rapid change of the 
securities market and the lengthy period to pass the amendments can easily render the 
proposed changes outdated before they are enacted. The problem will be magnified if 
the regulation is only reviewed once every ten years. The SFC should review the 
regulation more regularly as its resources permitted. 
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Transparency of Ownership 
Generally, the proposed changes will improve the mechanism of disclosure 
regime in Hong Kong. However, the low transparency of ownership will reduce their 
effectiveness. 
Disclosure regimes do not require nominees and trustees to report the ultimate 
beneficial owners of shares that are held by them. The concept of separate legal 
entity，as demonstrated in the case of Salomon v Salomon51，enables beneficial 
owners of conceal their identities. The nominee is the legal owner of the shares and 
is not required to disclose the beneficial owner whose shares are held by them. Most 
listed companies in Hong Kong are family-owned and its shareholding is usually 
concentrated among few family members. Their shares are usually held by nominee 
company. 
As such, most company registers become a list of nominee companies but the 
beneficial owner remains anonymous. It defeats the purpose of the share register, 
which aims to reveal the identity of controllers of the company. It is necessary to 
identify these controllers so as to ensure compliance with regulations, such as the 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance. In the absence of an effective counteract 
mechanism, the public and regulators have to rely on voluntary disclosure by the 
interested parties and verification of information is often too difficult if not 
impossible. 
51 [1897] AC 22 HL 
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On the contraiy, Singapore puts a greater emphasis on revealing the beneficial 
owner of any interest. The regulations in Singapore empower the companies to 
identify the true identities of its shareholders, and require them to strictly adhere to 
this principle in practice. For instance, bearer shares are not acceptable in most 
financial transactions. On the contrary, the 'know your customer，rule is not strictly 
enforced in Hong Kong. Banks generally have a higher awareness in this area, as they 
are required by the Code of Banking Practice to do so. SFC should also strictly 
enforce this requirement on brokers and financial intermediaries so that shareholders 
of offshore companies are identifiable. 
Some western countries such as UK and US have already strengthened their 
regulations in this regard. The importance of disclosure of beneficial owner is to 
provide regulators with critical information to trace illegal trading activities. 
Althou^i Hong Kong regulators have an extensive power to enforce regulations, the 
lack of fundamental information hampers their ability to effectively exercise their 
duties. With the increasing volume and complexity of securities transactions, this 
area is certainly in need of improvement. 
The problem here is further aggravated with a large number of family-
controlled business and highly complicated shareholding structures. The original 
proposal by SFC requires person who holds more than 10% interest in a company 
which is a substantial shareholder of a listed company. Admittedly, this may pose a 
practical problem since the person may be a trustee which means the notification will 
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not provide meaningful information. As long as disclosure of beneficial owner is not 
required, nominees and trustees will continue to be an ideal shield for shareholding. 
The essences of the disclosure are to provide regulators and the investing 
public with adequate information to make informed investment decisions and to 
maintain an orderly market. Such information is crucial to the supervision of market 
manipulation and insider dealing. In the next chapter, we will discuss regulations of 




Development of Securities (Insider Pealing Ordin.n.. ^ t ^ ^ ^ 
The insider dealing regulation was first introduced in Hong Kong in 1974 as 
_ of the Securities Ordinance. At that time, insider dealing was a criminal offence. 
On conviction, person would subject to a maximum fine of HK$50,000 and an 
imprisonment of two years. However, in 1978, the Securities (Amendment) 
Ordinance repealed this part from the Ordinance.彻 Insider Dealing Tribunal can 
^ P U b H c 咖 囊 o n t h e Insider Dealing was not an offence since 
then. 
In 1991，the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap 395) [‘SIDO’] came 
" ^ t 0 她 如 t h e S C 0 ^ o f ^ r dealing and to give further power to the 
T r i b U n a I t 0 t h e 0 f f e n d e r . 饭 dicier Dealing Tribunal is empowered to 
disquaiify an insider from being a director of a company. It can also order the insider 
to pay a penalty of not exceeding three times the amount of profit gained or loss 
avoided This legislation was subsequently amended in 1994 and 1995 to enhance the 
coverage of the Ordinance and it has been in operation until today. 
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Overview of the Supervision of Insider Dealing Activities 
in Hong Kong and Singapore 
The SIDO defines the circumstances which are classified as insider dealing, as 
well as power of the Insider Dealing Tribunal to inquire and to issue order on the 
insider dealer. It applies to all listed companies on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong. Companies incorporated overseas must abide by this legislation. 
Broadly speaking, insider dealing takes place when an insider uses price-
sensitive information knowingly to trade in the listed securities of that company. It is 
equally unlawful if he procures a tippee to trade. The SFC will watch for unusual 
movement of stock prices and trading pattern52. When SFC identify a suspected case, 
it will further investigate and submit a report to the Financial Secretary. The 
Financial Secretary will review and decide if he should refer the case to the Insider 
Dealing Tribunal for further inquiry. The Insider Dealing Tribunal has the statutory 
power to obtain documents, require any person to attend sittings and to issue order 
and penalty. The convicted person can be fined up to HK$ 100,000 or an 
imprisonment of 6 months if he refuses to cooperate. The Tribunal can also issue 
disqualification order. However, insider dealing by itself is not a criminal or civil 
offence. The Tribunal can only register its order with the Court of Appeal and it is an 
offence to contravene an order of the court. 
The Tribunal will publish a report after its inquiry. There axe eight cases 
published by the Tribunal so far，which are 1) the Success Holdings Report; 2) the 
52 
Please refer to Appendix 7 for the investigation process of insider dealing in Hong Kong 
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Public International Investments Report; 3) Yanion International Holdings Report; 4) 
the Hong Kong Parkview Group Report; 5) the Chevalier (OA) International Report; 
6) the Hong Kong Worsted Mills Report; 7) Ngai Hing Hong Company Limited; and 
8) Emperor (China Concept) Investments Limited 
In Singapore, the provisions against insider dealing are included in Section 
103，104 and 105 of the Securities Industry Act ['SIA']. Section 103 defines 
circumstances of prohibited insider dealing activities. Section 104 sets out the 
penalty imposed on a convicted person. Section 105 deals with the compensation that 
the convicted person is liable to pay to the other person who suffers loss from the 
insider dealing transaction. The Corporate Disclosure Policy issued by The Stock 
Exchange of Singapore also prohibits an insider to trade in the securities unless the 
price-sensitive information is disseminated to the general public53. Insiders should 
wait 24 hours after a press release and 48 hours if the announcement is conducted 
through less widespread channel. 
Singapore does not designate a third party, say the Hong Kong Insider Dealing 
Tribunal, to investigate and to proceed against the alleged case of insider dealing. 
Such responsibility lies with the Monetary Authority of Singapore54. 
53 SES Listing Manual, sl207 
54 SIA, s(5) to (13) 
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Circumstances of Insider Dealing 
When Insider Dealing Takes Place55? 
In Hong Kong, insider dealing occurs when a person, in possession of relevant 
information, deals in listed securities56 Such relevant information can be primary 
information obtained by a person connected with the corporation concerned, or 
secondary information that a person obtained from another insider. It is against this 
Ordinance whether the insider deals in the securities directly by himself, or provides 
such information to another person who he knows will make use of the information to 
trade. It is also unlawful if the person who receives such information makes use of it 
to deal in the securities, irrespective of whether the person actively seeks the 
information or is only a passive recipient57. One essential element to establish an 
insider dealing case is that the recipient knows it is relevant information and is 
provided by a person connected with the corporatioa 
GeneraUy，SIA58 and SIDO are similar in terms of the definition of insider 
dealing. In both jurisdictions, a tippee who receives price-sensitive information from 
an insider can be charged of insider dealing. However, sub-tippee is not caught. One 
major difference is the dealing by tippees. In Singapore, it is only an offence if the 
insider and the tippee are associated or they have any prior arrangement for the 
56 ^ f e r t 0 知 腳 版 8 — 9 f o r circumstances of insider dealing in Hong Kong and Singapore 
58 ^ ^ 3 G C n e r a l , S R e f e r e n c e ^ 0 1 1 9 8 8 ) [ 1 9 8 9 ] 1 仏 971, English Court of Appeal 
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communication of price-sensitive information59. According to SIDO, dealing of 
tippee is insider dealing and the non-existence of collaboration is irrelevant. 
Consider an example where X overheard a price-sensitive information from an 
insider Y and he trades by using such information. It is possible that X is not deemed 
to engage in insider dealing in either Hong Kong or Singapore. It is a defence in Hong 
Kong if X does not know Y is an insider. In Singapore, it should prove that X and Y 
are not 'associated'. 
Who is "Connected Person"? 
According to SIDO, connected persons are those who have access to 
information as a result of their positions and/or relationship with the corporation60 A 
person is deemed connected if he has one of the following connections in the past six 
months. It includes officers, directors and substantial shareholders Who hold more 
than 10% of the company's share. It also includes officers of another company that 
has professional or business relationship with this company, such as bankers, 
financial advisors and auditors. It only applies to officers of public bodies such as 
LEGCO and SEHK. Application of SIDO also extends beyond natural person to a 
corporation if any of its directors or employees is connected. 
Again^ coverage of SIDO and SIA in this area is quite similar. The SIA lists 
out potential insider by their positions or occupations. On the other hand, SIDO is 
39 SIA, si03(3) 
60 SIDO, s4(l) 
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more general and verbose. It puts more emphasis on the nature of relationship 
between a person and a company that may reasonably provide him with insider 
information. For instance, SIA explicitly states trustees and persons administering an 
arrangement are insiders61. This is only implied in the SIDO. 
A more material difference between the two is the interpretation of substantial 
shareholder, which was discussed in the previous chapter Singapore, similar to most 
other advanced countries, regards substantial shareholders as those who hold more 
than 5% of the voting shares of a corporation. In Hong Kong, the threshold limit is 
10%. This threshold should be lowered to increase market transparency. 
What is 'Relevant Information? 
Relevant information is the specific information about a company which is not 
genemlly known to the investor and is likely to materially affect the price of its 
securities62. Thus, for example, if a person knows that a transaction will materialise 
and the announcement of this information will affect the price of a listed security, he 
is in possession of relevant information. 
In Hong Kong, a person has relevant information if the following are 
established: 
(i) he knew the information 
(¾ he knew that it is 'specific information' 
61 SIA, sl03(12)(e) 
62 SIDO, s8 
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(iii) he knew what sort of people who are accustomed to deal in the stock 
(iv) he knew what are generally known to them 
(v) he knew what they would do if they had the same information that he had 
Defence to Insider Dealing 
In Hong Kong and Singapore, it is a defence to insider dealing if the person 
does not know it is insider information63. Hong Kong court also accepts defence that 
the person's intention of dealing in the securities is not related to making a profit or 
avoiding a loss64. These are two of the most commonly used defences for insider 
dealing However, this section only applies when there is evidence to show that the 
trading itself is wholly unconnected with such motive. A person makes a profit if the 
value of his share increases, and it is independent of whether the share has been sold 
0 r i f t h e r e i s — P r o f l t r e a l i s 毗 比 other words, the fact that a person realised a loss 
or did not sell the share after making a book profit cannot be used as a proof of 
motive. It can only be treated as a relevant evidence. 
The Tribunal will also consider a defence that a person is compelled by 
circumstances to realise his profit no matter he had or had not the relevant 
informatioiL Success Holdings attempted to defend itself based on this argument 
However，the court rejected this argument as it failed to prove that the profit motive 
was not a significant consideratioa 
SIDO, s 5 � andSIA, sl03(ll) 
64 SIDO, si 0(3) 
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Yainon International is the only Tribunal case that based its argument on loss 
avoidance. The defendant claimed that he needed to liquidate the shares and used the 
sale proceeds to purchase a property. However, the company did not purchase any 
property nor had any property under consideration at the time of the transaction. The 
court has subsequently rejected this defence. 
Consequences of Insider Dealing 
Insider Dealing is not a criminal offence in Hong Kong. The Insider Dealing 
Tribunal can only issue the following orders65: 
� a disqualification order that prohibits a person from being a director, 
liquidator，receiver or manager of a company for a maximum period of 5 
years. 
(b) pay to the Government an amount not exceeding three times thb profit gained 
or loss avoided. 
( C ) a 评旭办 o f a n a m o u n t n o t exceeding three times the profit gained or loss 
avoided 
65 SIDO, s23 
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Disqualification Orders 
It is the duty of eveiy officer of a corporation to ensure that proper safeguards 
are in place to prevent the company and its employees from insider dealing66. If any 
officer of a corporation committed an offence, he and the company are guilty and 
shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly67. 
The Tribunal has laid down the principles of issuing disqualification order in 
The Success Holdings Report68: 
‘(a) In determining whether to disqualify an insider dealer from holding office as a 
director of a listed company, or of listed companies, there comes into play a 
number of considerations. The determination will take into account the need 
to ensure the integrity of the securities market; to protect the public from 
further abuse by that person of the privileged position of trust which that 
office carries; to deter others from breaching that trust; and to mark the 
disapproval of the investment community with the conduct of the insider 
dealer. 
(b) In determining whether to disqualify an insider dealer from holding office as a 
director of a private company, one should have regard to the connection, if 
any，of the company with the insider dealing, and any relationship between the 
insider dealer and the private company; and the impact upon the individual of 
such a disqualification.' 
66 SEDO, sl3 
67 SEDO, s34(l) 
68 Report of Insider Dealing Tribunal on Success Holdings Ltd, Point (6) & (7) of page 97 
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Insider dealing is a criminal offence in Singapore. Directors and officers of a 
convicted company who take part in the transaction are also guilty of the offence. 
They are liable to pay a fine not exceeding SG$50，000 or to an imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 7 years 9. In addition, the Court may also make order 
disqualifying them from being a director and management of companies for 5 years70. 
Financial Penalties 
The Tribunal can impose a maximum penalty not exceeding three times the 
profit gained or loss avoided by all persons as a result of insider dealing71. The 
Tribunal will consider the difference between purchase price of shares before the 
information is available to the public and the new price level within a reasonable 
period. Profit or loss arisen after the reasonable period will be treated separately from 
insider dealing. If price of the share falls, it is possible that the profit gained 
calculated by the Tribunal is greater than the actual profit realised. For instance, in 
the Hong Kong Worsted Mills case, Tai had not sold his shares and subsequently, 
share price fell and he incurred a loss. When the Tribunal made reference to the 
share price movements within the reasonable period, it concluded that there was a 
'profit arising' of HK$6 million and ordered a payment of HK$3 million. 
It is worthwhile to note that Section 23(l)(b) measures the profit gained 
resulted from the dealing of the insider dealer only, and Section 23(l)(c) extends to 
69 SIA, si 04 
70 CA, sl57 
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total profit gained of any other person who took advantage of the insider information. 
A tipper shall pay a penalty equivalent to three times of the total gain of the tippees. 
In Singapore, the company has to pay a maximum fine of SG$ 100,00072. In 
addition, the convicted person should also pay compensation to the person who 
suffers loss from the transactioa The amount of compensation is the difference 
between the price of securities in that transaction and the likely price if insider 
dealing has not occurred73. 
Case Studies 
In this section, we shall look into two cases investigated by the Hong Kong 
Insider Dealing Tribunal and to see if the outcome would be different if the 
investigation is conducted in Singapore. 
71 SIDO, s25 
72 SIA, sl04(a)& (b) 
73 SIA, si05 � & � 
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A Successful Case 
7 A 
- H o n g Kong Parkview Group Ltd 
Background 
Hong Kong Parkview Group Ltd ['HKPVG'] was listed in Hong Kong under 
the name of Ming Ren Investment and Enterprises Ltd on 24th November 1973. This 
company is controlled by the Hwang family which holds 74.84% of the voting shares 
as at 13th August 1993. Mr. C.S. Hwang is the founder of the company. On 13th 
August 1993，Mr. C.S. Hwang and Mr. Peter Sin purchased 974,000 shares and 
100,000 shares of HKPVG respectively. Closing price of HKPVG share on 13th 
August was $2.85. On the same day, Hwang flew to Beijing to meet with the General 
Manager ofUNIPEC, Mr Jiang Yun-long. On 17th August, HKPVG announced that a 
placement of 89million shares to UNIPEC at HKS2.85 per share. On 19th August, the 
share price increased to $4,325. The inquiry was to determine whether Hwang and 
Sin should be identified as insider dealer. 
Key questions 
The questions considered by the Tribunal were: 
(i) Was Mr. C.S. Hwang a person connected to HKPVT as defined in s4(l)(c) of 
SIDO? 
(ii) Did they possess relevant information at the time of purchase? 
(iii) Did they know that it was relevant information? 
4 Report of Insider Dealing Tribunal on Hong Kong Parkview Group Ltd 
. 4 1 
Connected person 
Hwang's shareholding in HKPVG is 6.73%. Singapore would undoubtedly 
regard him as a substantial shareholder and connected person since the threshold 
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there is 5% , However, this shareholding level does not make him a substantial 
shareholder in Hong Kong. Therefore, the Tribunal had to established that he was an 
insider by virtue of the business relationship between himself and the company76. 
Hwang was the Chairman of HKPVG until June 1992. However, he did not 
move out his office in Central and still worked there frequently. The Tribunal 
considered that Hwang had only removed his title but not his authority or influence on 
the company. 
Albeit his retirement, Hwang had successfully strike a number of deals for 
HKPVG such as the Beihei oil refinery, Hainan oil refinery, Indonesian oil as well as 
the placement with UNIPEC in questiorL 
Hwang's son George was the Chairman of HKPVG at that time. The Tribunal 
found that George had little involvement in the placement, and his approval was 
merely a formality. On the other hand, the Tribunal discovered a fax from UNIPEC 
to Hwang that reads 'Reference is made to the agreement between you and the 
undersigned dated 13th August 1993, we hereby agree to take up 89 million shares in 
75 SIA, sl03(9)(b) & (c) 
76 SEDO, s4<c X*0 
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the capital of your company....'77. It revealed that Hwang was the true decision 
maker behind the scene. 
The Tribunal concluded that Hwang is a connected person as defined by 
s4(l)(c) of SIDO. 
Relevant information 
In deciding whether Hwang possessed relevant information, the Tribunal had 
to ascertain that the information must be 'specific', 'not generally known' and 'likely 
to materially affect the price of those securities.' 
Specific 
On 13th August, Hwang knew that he would offer the placement ofHKPVG to 
UNTPEC and he had reason to believe that his offer will be accepted. The information 
he possessed is specific enough for the purpose of s8 and s9(l) of SIDO. 
According to si03 of SIA, information need not be specific. If the 
information was possessed as a consequence of his position in the company, it is 
insider dealing. The question of 'specific or not, would not pose a big difference in 
this case. In PP v Choudhury78’ specific is construed as 4contradistinctioii to general'. 
The main concern is not whether the information is precise. It is insider information 
if the knowledge of it would affect the investment decision of a reasonable investor. 
77 � 
Report of Insider Dealing Tribunal oil Hong Kong Parkview Group Ltd, pp30 
78 (1976) 68 DLR (3d) 592 
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In Singapore, it is an important criterion to prove that the insider obtained 
information by virtue of his position or business connection with the company. If the 
information is obtained from an outside source, he is not liable to insider dealing. 
For example, if Hwang obtained such information from a friend whom he knew was 
not a connected person, he was not liable of insider dealing in Singapore. 
Unfortunately, since he obtained such information in his capacity of substantial 
shareholder, he would be liable. 
Not generally known 
The placement was not generally known to the public until it was announced 
til fjn 
on 17 August, On 13 August, the date when Hwang purchased the shares, the 
investing public was not aware of this placement. In fact, it is natural that this kind of 
confidential information is not available to the public before the announcement. 
Purchase before public announcement could be insider dealing. 
In Singapore, it is an offence to use price-sensitive information if the 
counterparty is not aware of such information. Insiders should not trade on the listed 
securities within 24 hours of publishing the press release79. However, there is no 
requirement on unlisted securities. The purpose of the timeframe is to ensure that 
there is sufficient dissemination of the information to the public. If an insider trades 
before the suggested timeframe, it can be argued that the information is not yet 
generally available and he could be charged of insider dealing. 
79 Corporate Disclosure Policy of SES Listing Manual, chl2 
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Likely to materially affect the price of those securities 
Between 12 to 20 August, share price of HKPVG rose 64% when the Heng 
一 � tVi 
Seng Index only rose 2.8%. Part of the rise was caused by Hwang's purchase on 13 
August. It was also attributed to the fact that the placee was a PRC company and 
there was a general bullish sentiment on China concept shares at that time. 
Interestingly, the Tribunal made reference to a Singapore case PP v Alan Ng 
Poh Meng in its interpretation of ‘likely to materially affect the price of those 
securities'. In circumstances as such, the court should consider whether it is more 
likely than less likely to affect the price of the securities. 
Since si03 of SIA creates criminal liability, men rea must be shown before 
such liability can be established It must be proven that the insider information was a 
factor that the insider used to reach the transaction decision. Once the court found 
that he had insider information and he subsequently entered into transaction, the 
insider should show that such information was not a factor in his decision. 
Considering the facts available to the Tribunal, there will be no problem to 
establish that Hwang possessed relevant information and his trade was driven by this 
information. He would be convicted in Singapore. 
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Knowledge 
Considering the above findings, it is obvious that Hwang knew he possessed 
relevant information. In fact, Hwang attempted to drive up the share price so that he 
could bargain a higher placement price with UNIPEC. This will be discussed in the 
following session. 
Defence 
It is a defence if the insider establishes that ‘he entered into the transaction 
otherwise than with a view to the making of profit...by the use of relevant 
• . 80 
information.' However, the proof of non-profit making motive cannot be a 
defence in Singapore. 
Hwang argued that he had not sold the shares to realise the profit, he was a 
steady buyer of HKPVG shares before and after the placement, and the shares were 
bought for long term investment instead of quick profit. The Tribunal found that his 
primary objective was to drive up the share price and thereby a higher price for the 
placement. The placement will inject a large amount of cash to the company and was 
certainly beneficial. Although his motive may not be personal gain, it is nevertheless 
profit-related. 
80 SIDO, sl0(3) 
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Mr. Peter Sin 
There is no evidence to show that he did attend the meeting on 13th August 
which the placement was discussed, or that he has any knowledge of the placement 
before his purchase. If Sin purchased shares because he knew Hwang had purchased 
large amount of shares, it is not insider dealing. Insider dealing can be established if 
he knew that Hwang was using insider information to trade. Sin was therefore not 
considered as an insider in Hong Kong or Singapore. 
Conclusion 
The Tribunal concluded that Hwang contravened s9(l)(a) and the defence of 
sl0(3) does not apply. He was disqualified as director ofHKPVG and its subsidiaries 
for 6 months. He should also pay $1,065,550 as profit gained and another $1,065,550 
as penalty. Lastly, he should pay 80% of expense incurred by the inquiry. 
An Unsuccessful Case 
-Chevalier (OA) International Ltd81 
Background 
Chevalier (OA) International Ltd [‘COAL，] was listed in Hong Kong in 1988. 
Mr. Y.C. Chow is the Chairman of the Chevalier Group of Companies. On 26th April 
1993，COAL issued 632,001,000 shares of which 53.79% was owned by Chow. 
8 L • 
Report of Insider Dealing Tribunal on Hong Kong Parkview Group Ltd, pp30 
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Between 26th April and 5th July 1993，Chow sold 28,180,000 shares representing 4.5% 
of his shareholding. 
COAL had been making a profit since its listing on 1988 until 1992/3 but the 
size of profit was diminishing. In 1992, the company announced a joint venture with 
Telstra on second generation cordless telephone (‘CT2’）and this project required 
heavy capital expenditure. On 13 January 1993，the company announced an interim 
loss of HK$16.878 million. Share price of COAL subsequently fell from 40 cents to 
38 cents. On 12th August 1993，it reported a loss for the year of KKS84.51 million. 
Share price fell from 40cents to 31 cents in two weeks. 
In between the interim and final results announcements, share price and 
turnover of COAL shares had on several occasions out-performed the market. Chow's 
share was sold during this period when the share price was the highest. 
The sales were effected by Capital Growth Limited which was the trustee of 
Chow's family trust namely Grace Hsin Ya Jen Trust. The trustee held a substantial 
number of warrants of Chevalier International Holdings Ltd ['CIHL'] and these 
warrants must be exercised before yearend to get the dividend. It was claimed that 
Chow sold his COAL shares to raise fimds to exercise the warrants. 
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Key questions 
There is no question that Chow is a connected person by virtue of his position 
as a Director and Chairman (either in Hong Kong or Singapore). The key questions 
are: 
(i) Did the sale of the 28.18milIion COAL shares come about as a result of Chow's 
'dealing' in those shares or 'counselling or procuring another to deal'. When did 
it take place? 
(ii) What information did Chow possess at the time of his dealing or counselling or 
procuring? 
(iii) Does that information qualify as relevant information? 
(iv) Did he know it was relevant information? 
(v) If the ingredients of s9(l)(a) have been proved by the evidence, should Chow not 
be identified as an insider dealer by virtue of sl0(3) of CAP 395? 
'Dealing’ or 'coimselling or procuring'? 
The crucial point is when the 'dealing' or counselling or procuring' took 
place. Did it end with his discussion with Peter Ng in March, or continue in April or 
early May? If so, did he know information in this period was relevant? The Tribunal 
proceeded oil the basis that Chow 'counselled or procured' the sales when he 
persuaded Peter Ng, director of the trust, to dispose of COAL shares. 
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What information Chow possessed? 
Chow received monthly consolidated management accounts every month. 
However, he claimed that he was not aware of the actual loss each month nor related 
such information with his sale of COAL shares on 26th April. He was not aware of 
the loss incurred by the CT2 business because he was not in charge of the 
telecommunication area. Nevertheless, evidence showed that Chow did review the 
management accounts. The Tribunal established that he knew the interim loss of 
HK$17 million had increased to HK$46.99 million as at February 1993. Furthermore, 
the Tribunal concluded that as early as May 1993, Chow knew that loss for the year 
would be HK$7 million greater than the monthly accounts. 
Was it relevant information? 
The Tribunal has to consider whether the knowledge of a year end loss of 
HKS54 million is specific, not generally known and likely to materially affect the 
price of COAL shares. Upon investigation, it concluded that all ingredients of 
‘relevant’ information are proved to be in existence. Information on the forthcoming 
annual loss of such size is specific. Chow certainly knew more information than the 
public. Share price of COAL had surged up from its true value of 38 cents to over 60 
cents in the anticipation of Shougang takeover. Despite the bullish sentiment at that 
time, information on yearend loss would dampen the speculation and likely to 
materially affect the share price. 
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* 
Did Chow know that he possessed relevant information? 
Evidences show that Chow had made a number of arrangements to hide the 
sale of his shares. It implies that he knew he had relevant information which would 
materially affect the price if it is known to the public. First, the trustee did not appoint 
a stockbroker to sell the share. Instead, Chow made the arrangement with a friend, 
C.H. Chow who was not a stockbroker. C.H. conducted the trade through the 
accounts of his relatives and two different brokers, with the intention to keep the sale 
away from public scrutiny. Later, Chow appointed Tung (who is a professional 
stockbroker) to replace C.H. to sell his share. An 'Oklahoma' account was later 
opened to further distant Chow from the sale. On 15th April, Chow told Tung that 
share price may increase over 50cents. 
Defence 
Chow claimed that his intention of the sale was to raise funds to exercise the 
CIHL warrants. The sale was not driven by loss avoidance. He had not considered 
the anticipated fall in share price after disappointing year end results announcements. 
His defence was accepted by the Tribunal considering that: (1) Chow has reported his 
dealing to SEHK accurately and timely; (2) Funds raised was applied to purchase the 
warrants; (3) He has informed his fellow directors of the disposal; (4) It was a logical 
choice to sell COAL share at that time; and (5) His credibility is acceptable. 
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Conclusion 
It was concluded that Chow's sale of COAL shares was not deemed to be an 
insider dealing. Since the defence used by Chow is not acceptable in Singapore court, 
there is a high probability that Chow would be convicted if this case was proceeded in 
Singapore. 
Commentary 
The above discussions have highlighted some major differences in insider 
dealing regulation between Hong Kong and Singapore. In this section, we will review 
whether the SIDO should adopt some of the practice of SIA or suggestions of other 
proponents. 
Should Insider Dealing be a Criminal Offence in Hong Kong? 
It is often considered that current SIDO does not provide sufficient penalty for 
deterring purpose. Insider dealing is a criminal offence in Singapore but not in Hong 
Kong. An offender shall only pay a financial penalty of three times the profit gained. 
In Singapore, the convicted person can be subject to an imprisonment of seven years. 
If insider dealing was a criminal offence in Hong Kong, it will be even more 
difficult to start a prosecution. The prosecutor should be able to present a higher 
standard of proof to start a criminal proceeding. However, the collection of sufficient 
evidence is very difficult as insider dealing transactions are well covered by layering 
transactions and offshore or nominee companies. The regulator may have to give up 
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the prosecution because of insufficient evidence. It is noteworthy that there is only 
one c a s e , v Allan Ng Poh Meng taken to the Singapore court since the enactment 
of SIA in 1986, This case was proceeded in 1989 and there has been no case in the 
past ten years. The increasing complexity of securities transactions and 
corresponding difficulties in obtaining the necessary evidence make it difficult to start 
criminal prosecution. On the contrary, the Hong Kong Insider Dealing Tribunal has 
looked in nine cases since the enactment of the current SIDO in 1991. 
The best legislation should be good in theory and in practice. The current 
arrangement in Hong Kong gives regulators more flexibility and enables them to 
catch suspected cases more effectively. 
Should Insider Dealing be a Civil Offence in Hong Kong? 
If insider dealing is a civil offence, the person who suffers from the insider 
dealing can start a lawsuit against the insider. Will there be more cases reported? It 
may be true that this will provide an additional avenue uncover an insider dealing 
case. However, even regulators who are well equipped with the resources and 
knowledge find it difficult to successfully take action against insider dealings. 
Naturally, it will be more difficult for general public. The legal process itself is costly 
and lengthy, not to mention the technicality involved in identifying and getting the 
person convicted. It remains questionable if this is effective means to successful 
conviction. 
. 53 
Should Compensation Order be Imposed in Hong Kong? 
At present, investigation of insider dealing is initiated by the regulator and the 
public has low initiative to report suspected cases. If suffered persons are 
compensated for the loss resulted from insider transactions, will they have a better 
incentive to do so? 
Again interestingly, though the Singapore court can make compensation order, 
no such order has been successfully made in the past 13 years. 
To make a compensation order, the court needs to ascertain the identity of the 
person and to prove that he suffered from a transaction with an insider who trades on 
specific informatioa First, in the exchange-traded transaction, trades are conducted 
through a broker. Considering the vast number of trades, it is difficult to identify the 
counterparty. Secondly, it is even more difficult to prove that this person suffered a 
loss because of insider trading. Exchange-based transaction is price driven and the 
sale will go through whenever orders matched. Identity of the counterparty is 
unimportant. In other words, the person will sell his share anyway and insider dealing 
seems to have no effect on this transaction. Furthermore, the method of calculating 
profit gained or loss avoided is controversial, and we can expect additional 
difficulties when an additional factor (i.e. the amount of loss suffered by the person) 
is involved. It therefore seems that even the provision for compensation order is 
included in the Ordinance, there will be many problems to put it in practice. 
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Should the Existing Penalty be Increased? 
The existing penalty of three times the profit gained or losses avoided is 
already high. Though it can be argued that none of the nine cases investigated by the 
Tribunal are requested to pay the maximum penalty, the current scale is high in 
international standard. In the Hong Kong Worsted Mills inquiry, total monetary 
penalty is more than HKS33.8 million. In Singapore, the maximum penalty is 
S$50,000 to individual and S$100,000 to corporate. Even in the US, the maximum 
financial penalties to individual and corporate are US$1 mil and US$2.5mil 
respectively. 
The fact that maximum penalty is not imposed on these insiders is a matter of 
independent legal judgement. It should not seen as a demonstration of weakness in 
the Tribunal or the regulation itself. 
The major consideration of potential insider dealer is the probability of being 
caught and convicted. The amount of penalty will only come as a second thought. If 
there is only a meagre opportunity of conviction, the potential gain may well 
outweigh the penalty. In other words, simply increasing the amount of penalty will 





Most jurisdictions have a cooperation arrangement in place, called the 
Memorandum of Understandings [MOUs], that allows regulators to obtain 
information from their counterparts. Such information ranges from public information 
like company registry and trading histoiy to confidential transaction details obtained 
from investigation. For instance, the SFC has signed a MOU with Singapore as well 
as many other regional regulators such as Australia and Malaysia. 
In the investigation of Crownhampton Limited on possible insider dealing 
activities, the buying orders were placed through Singapore banks and SFC has sought 
assistance from the MAS to obtain evidence. However, the Bank Secrecy Law does 
not allow MAS to disclose the identity of customers. 
Insider dealers can easily shield transactions through offshore companies. 
Despite the presence of MOUs, regulatory differences among jurisdictions means that 
cross border monitoring is extremely difficult and in most cases, impossible. In 
particular, no matter how comprehensive a regulation is, insider dealer can structure 
the transactions to get through the loopholes. The best way to Hong Kong regulators 
perhaps, is to align its policy with its major counterparts worldwide so that we are on 
level playing field. Global investors will have less opportunity to take advantage of 
regulatory differences. In addition, joint investigation with overseas regulators can 
more effectively deal with cross-border transactions. 
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Reward the Informant 
At present, the government pays financial reward to the informant who can 
provide critical evidence on severe cases, such as murderer and burglary. Similarly, 
SFC may consider to reward the informant. For example, US regulator will pay up to 
10% of the penalty to the informant. 
The informant can be the employee of the same company, or person who has 
business relationship with the insider. They may have been induced to collaborate 
with the insider but have declined to do so. Or they may have participated in the 
transaction. In all circumstances, the informant will have concern on the bad 
consequences of his reporting, such as termination of his employment. In order to 
encourage related parties to inform, there should be protection clauses or provisions 
in regulations to protect them from repercussion. 
Public Education 
Following from the above discussion, the SFC should increase the public 
awareness on a 'rightful' securities transaction. It is similar to the promotion of anti-
corruption by ICAC. After more than 20 years, the ICAC has successfully instilled a 
correct attitude among the public. SFC has been spending much efforts on public 
education It is certainly a direction which it should further explore. 
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Corporate Governance 
Securities practitioners argued that the disclosure requirement to the SFC may 
sometimes infringe the confidentiality of commercial agreement. In addition, it is 
difficult to avoid leakage of price-sensitive information. Clerical staff，secretaries 
and junior officers may possess this information in the course of exercising their 
duties. However, many of them have a low awareness of keeping the information in 
confidence. These circumstances cannot be well defined by law. It is the 
responsibility of listed companies to establish a sufficient internal control and 
reporting mechanism. 
SFC should promote a high standard of corporate governance through the 
issuance of clear principles and best practice guides to listed companies. These 
guidelines are not statutory nor a minimal standard. It serves as a basis for company 
to formulate an appropriate code of conduct and practices to be observed by its staff. 
It is common in Hong Kong that most listed companies only maintain the 
minimum public float of 35% and the remaining is concentrated in a few substantial 
shareholders, usually family members. The operation of many family businesses is 
opaque. Furthermore, most listed companies are incorporated overseas and are not 
regulated by the Companies Ordinance. In order to ensure a level playing field for 
investors, there should be good corporate governance policy to ensure that the 
company acts vigilantly to maximise the interests of all shareholders. Apart from 
imposing duty of disclosure and due diligence in securities trading, the SFC should 
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require listed companies to meet accounting and auditing standards that meet 
internationally quality. 
Self Regulation 
It is the responsibility of SFC to provide an environment that encourages 
corporate governance. However, its enforcement is a private responsibility. There is 
limit on the comprehensiveness of regulations but not on the variety of transactions. 
The market should determine what should be done and what should not be done. To 
this end, it is more appropriate for the market participants to supervise and uphold 
the standard among themselves. 
SFC should delegate the continual monitoring duty to the frontline self-
regulatoiy bodies such as the SEHK. In the past, the SEHK has been criticised as a 
member's club that acts in favour of member's interests. SFC should make the SEHK 
I 
more accountable to the general public and increase its supervision on the self 
regulatoiy system. In addition, there should be parallel development in the statutory 
requirements such as disclosure of interests and non-statutory rules issued by the 
SEHK. 
Most importantly, SEHK should cultivate an ethical business culture. It is one 
of the primary duties of market practitioners to ensure compliance and it is in their 
best interests to do so. Malpractice such as insider dealing are detrimental to market 
integrity and confidence of international investor. They should protect a fair playing 
field for all participants. 
. 59 
Continual Improvement of the Regulation and Investigation 
The most effective way to counteract insider dealing is improving our 
regulation. It is glad that SFC has been continuously updating itself on market 
development and proposing changes to the existing regulations (The SIA has not been 
updated since 1986!). Regulations should be tightened in response to current market 
practice and be streamlined to remove redundant requirements. A solid legal 





Hong Kong has gained a reputation for its well established supervisoiy 
framework and one of the most efficient market in international terms. However, its 
regulatory requirements seems to lag behind its worldwide counterparts and there 
have been calls for improvement to support the growth of the local securities market. 
In this regard, SFC has issued a consultation paper on the amendments to the 
Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance in June 1998. The Consultation was 
concluded on September 1998 and a conclusion has been issued on March 1998. The 
proposal aims to align local disclosure requirements with international standards; to 
update the Ordinance on current market practices; to improve market transparency 
and to remove those unnecessaiy burdensome statutory requirements. Some of the 
proposed amendments are discussed in Chapter II. 
In the previous chapters, we have discussed a number of improvements on 
regulations to increase market transparency and to protect investors' interests. 
However, these suggestions alone cannot create a well-regulated market if there is no 
corresponding enhancement in power of our regulator. Regulator should be 
sufficiently empowered to administer and enforce the regulations. SFC would be a 
paper tiger unless its enforcement power is improved to give it the same strength of 
regulators of other jurisdictions. 
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At present, the comprehensive legal framework and disclosure mechanism 
still seems inadequate to catch insider dealing activities. An investigation by the SFC 
and then by the Insider Dealing Tribunal took years to complete. The long 
investigation period poses an additional problem in collection of evidence. Witnesses 
may not recall details of the incidence and even cannot be contacted. Furthermore, 
the involvement of two investigation parties may duplicate the resources and 
therefore ineffective. The merit of Insider Dealing Tribunal is being independent 
and objective. On the other hand, it will be more effective if SFC is solely 
responsible for the investigation process and can penalise the offender. There will be 
a better chance of successful convictioiL 
This inadequacy is further aggravated by the fact that the supervisory power of 
SFC does not extend to the securities arm of financial institutions, which is now being 
monitored by the HKMA. This arrangement creates a grey area that practitioners may 
take advantage of supervisory differences, though HKMA and SFC frequently 
exchange market information. In order to improve the level of market supervision, 
HKMA and SFC should jointly supervise the securities activities of banks. 
There is a trend to merge different supervisory bodies into a single and 
powerful regulator on the international front. A good example is the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) in Singapore. It has much wider power to supervise the 
whole family of financial institutions, including banks, securities firms and insurance 
companies. In case where one unit commits a prohibited activity, the regulator may 
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punish the whole group by more stringent regulatory supervision, or even revoke its 
licence. 
A super-regulator may be hindered by its size and bureaucratic structure to be 
effective. Sadly, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is being regarded as a big 
elephant with many internal problems. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the 
public is not receptive to the idea of a powerful regulator in Hong Kong. There are 
also worries that a powerful regulator will result in over-regulation. 
Nonetheless, if SFC is given additional authority and discretion in exercising 
its duties to maintain market integrity and transparency, it creates a better trading 
environment that promotes the public interests. The regulator should be sufficiently 
empowered to supervise, investigate and bring justice to the public. At the same time, 
there should be an increasing acceptance of the power of regulator and tightening of 








CORPORATE SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDER NOTICE 
j ^ ^ .,.... 
j • * . ‘I DISCLOSURE OF INTEREST 
No statutory form has been prescribed under the Ordinance. This notice form is provided for your use by the 
Securities and Futures Commission. 
You should, however, note that your statutory obligations are determined by the Ordinance not by the notice form 
provided. When making your disclosure, therefore, you must satisfy yourself as to the requirements of the 
Ordinance and, if in doubt, you should seek appropriate legal advice. You are free to make the required disclosures 
i in some other written form. 
EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR CORPORATE SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDERS ON COMPLETING THIS NOTICE FORM 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Rcfcrcnccs to the Ordinance are references to the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Cap. 356). 
This notice form is to tx completed by corporations/companies when making their disclosures of a notifiable interest in relevant share 
capital of the listed company disclosed at paragraph 1 of the notice form. 
This notice form is to be used by corporations/companies to notify the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (±t “ScHK") and the listed 
company concerned of, amongst other things, the following:— 
(i) An interest in 10% or more of the relevant share capital (i.e. voting shares) of a listed comply. 
(ii) Ceasing to have a notifiable interest (i.e. dropping below 10%). 
(iii) An increase or decrease in the pcrccntage level of your holdings that results in you crossing ovtr a whole percentage number 
(e.g. 10.9% increases to 11.1%). 
The term 4'substantial shareholder** is not defined in the Ordinance but is used in this noticc form and ihcs^ zctts for descriptive purposes 
• only. A substantial shareholder is someone who has an interest in 10% or more of the relevant share capiul concerned (i.e. voting shares 
of the company). 
For record purposes it is advisable to keep a copy of all disclosures that arc made. 
You should note that the duties of disclosure of substantial shareholders, in most cases, have to tx fjlfilled 5 days next following-
the day upon which ihos^ duties arise. In cases of doubt, legal advice should be taken. 
If any of the interests in relevant share capital of the listed company are held as a result of a section 9 acquisition agreement then you arc 
advised to ukc legal advicc is no standard notice form is provided by the Securities and Futures Corrjrissicr. for the purposes of 
disclosure. 
If you have insufficicru space, complete your disclosures on a separate shest 一 a photocopy of an ur.cor.plr.id page 2 cculd be used 
provided that it is signed and dearly marked “Additional Sheet**. 
When completing this nodes form use block letters, preferably typewritten. 
In eases of ambiguity staff of the SEHK may telephone you for clarification. 
If you have any queries about the Ordinance or your obligations thereunder you should consult your Icgil z: ether professional adviser. 
The fact that you do not have all the information required by the notice form should not prevent you frcrz filing the notic: form if you arc 
aware you arc under a duty to disclose. Information not currcmly available should be provided when it bccrtr.ts available. 
You must always complete the entire form, particularly paragraph 5, even if you arc only supplying dcoili .tquirtd by section 7(6) and 
there ha5 b t^tx no disclosablc change in the size of your interests. 
This nciics form is only to be completed by a person properly authorized by the corporatioa'compar.v rr-ai^ g disclosurt. 
/ FILING REQUIREMENTS 
A signed copy of this nocic: must be filed with the SEHK using cr.c of the following methods:— 
By Post 一 The SDI Unit 
Compliance Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
G.P.O. Box 10023 
Hong Kot)g 
This is dcdicaud P.O. Box for the SDI Unit only. You should not use the general SEHK P.O. Bo;. 
By Hand 一 The SDI Unit 
Compliarx? Division The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
Towtr I & II. Fxrhangg Square 
Ccstnl. Hoog Koog 
By Fx\ 一 Fxx No.: W5632S 
For jeeunry msoos. no ether S5KK fix number should be used. You arc asked to pay ^  m ： ansntion to ensuring the preper hx manber is used. 
Telephone ccnnrnuucci of fxi notification can be ocii incd frcrr. 5233759. Ycu art asxrc r: r=rx: use of this scrvicc to 
s:gnif;c3xu or p n « sensitive nocificaticns. 
A ccpy of thii rcc« icm mus: also be filed with xhc company rcrtrrtd to at paragraph 1 cf L^c accrr fcrm a: its registered officc 
cr principal pbet of business in Hong Kong. You should ujee every rtosonablv practicabic sttp to c^ i^ rr rs: i^c nctict form rcachcs the 
S£KK fm;. 
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INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLETING THE NOTICE FORM 
The box marked ••Rcf. No." can be used for your own record purposes. 
1. Paragraph 1 
Complete the name of the company and its stock code. The stock code can be obtained from the SEHK or from the company 
concerned. Even if the stock code is not known the notice form should still be completed and filed. 
2. Paragraph 2 
Describe the relevant share capital to which the notification relates. A small number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong have two classes of share capital, each with voting rights (i.e. " A " and “ B " shares). If the 
corporation/company is a substantial shareholder of both classes of share capital then two separate notices should be completed. 
3. Paragraph 3 � ’ ， 
The name and address of the corporation/company making disclosure of its interests must be set out in full in English. 
4. Paragraph 4 
In order to disclosc the reason for disclosure at 4(b), tick the box number corresponding to one or more of the following 
reasons. For example, if you acquire shares which increase the notifiable percentage level then you would tick the boxes 
• numbered “ 1 " and “ 3 " . If your acquisition is as a result of a company, in which you arc interested pursuant to section 8, 
acquiring shares you would tick the boxes numbered " 1 " , “ 3 " and 
You should note that if you tick the box numbered “ 7 " then, apart from signing, you do not need to complete the remainder of 
the notice form. 
Reason for disclosure * 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Box Number 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital of listed company giving rise to a duty to disclose. “ 1 " 
Initial disclosure “ 2 
Change in percentage level of notifiable interest “ 3 * 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a corporation subject to section 8(2), (3) and (4) 
(see note 1) 
Disclosure of particulars required by section 7(6) (see note 2) “ 5 " 
Change in particulars required by section 7(6) (sec note 2) " 6 " 
Cease to have notifiable interest “ 7 " 
Note 1: ‘ 
Section 8(2), (3) and (4) deems you to be interested in shares in the relevant share capital of a listed company that are held by 
a corporation the directors of which are accustomed to act in accordance with your directions or in which you can exercise one-
third or more of the voting rights. 
. N o t e 2: , ( 
The particulars required by section 7(6) of the Ordinance arc the names of and the number of shares held by the registered 
shareholders. 
5. Paragraph 5 
All interests in relevant share capital including those that the corporation/company is deemed to be interested in as a result of 
section 8 (i.e. corporate interests) are to be disclosed. If this is an initial disclosure paragraph 5(b) is not applicable. 
6. Paragraph 6 
The name of the person or company with whom a joint interest in shares is held should be disclosed. It should be noted that the 
person or company with whom the joint interest is held has to make separate disclosures of ihcir own if they have a notifiable . 
interest. 
7. Paragraph 7 
Disclosc the interests in relevant share capital held through other corporations pursuant to section 8 of the Ordinance. If you 
have any doubts about the consequences of section 8 of the Ordinance legal advice should be taken. If these corporations' 
interests exceed the notifiable percentage they will have to make separate disclosures. 
8. Paragraph 8 
The Ordinance requires the disclosure of the names and addresses of the registered shareholders of the shareholding in the listed 
company disclosed at paragraph 5(a). Lack of knowledge of these particulars should not prrvtm a notice form being filed, 
i These particulars can be sent to the SEHK and the company conccmed when they arc obtained. 
YOU MUST SIGN THE NOTICE FORM AND INDICATE IN WHAT CAPACITY YOU ARE SIGNING IT. 
YOU SHOULD CHECK THE NOTICE FORM BEFORE SIGNING IT TO ‘\1AXH SURE THAT EVERYTHING THAT YOU HAVE 
STATED IS CORRECT. 
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APPENDIX 2 
INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDER NOTICE 
‘ - � D I S C L O S U R E O F INTEREST “ ” ^ 
N o statutory f o r m has b«en prescr ibed u n d e r t h e O r d i n a n c e . T h i s notice f o r m Is provided for your use b y t h e 
S€cunt i e s and Futures Commiss ion . 
Y o u should , however , note that y o u r s t a t u t o r y o b l i g a t i o n s a r e determined by the Ordinance not by the not i ce f o r m 
provided. W h e n making y o u r d isc losure , t h e r e f o r e , y o u m u s t sat i s fy yourself zs to the requirements of the 
Ordinance and , If in doubt, you s h o u l d s e e k a p p r o p r i a t e l ega l advice . Y o u are free to make the required d i s c l o s u r e s 
in s o m e other written form. 
EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR I N D I V I D U A L S U B S T A N T I A L SHAREHOLDERS O N COMPLETING THIS N O T I C E F O R M 
GENERAL INFORMATION. . 
•References to the Ordinance are references to the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinaiice (Cap. 396). . 
. • . • . 
Jhis.Mtice form .is to be completed by individuals when making their disclosures of a notifiable interest in the relevant share caDital of the 
listed company disclosed at paragraph 1 of the notice form. 
If you are a director or chief executive do not complete this notice form. A separate notice form is available and should be used. 
This notice form is to be used by individuals to notify the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (the “SEHK") and the listed company 
concerned of. amongst other things, the following:— 1 
(i) An interest in 105 or more of the relevant share capital (i .e. voting shares) of a listed company. 
(ii) Ceaiing to have a notifiable interest (i.e. dropping below 10¾). 
CT (iH) ^ ?r decrease in 加 percentage level of yoiir holdings that results in you crossing ov-r a whole wrceauzc number • (e.g. 10.9% increases to M.1%). 、广 5 
The term "substantial shareholder" is not defined in the Ordinance but is used in this notice form and these cotes for descriptive purposes 
only. A substantial shareholder is someone who has an interest in 10¾ or more of the relevant share capital ccncsmed (i e votinz shares 
of the company). ‘ 6 
For record purposes, it is advisable to keep a copy of all disclosures that are made. 
You should note that the duties of disclosure of substantial shareholders, in most eases, have to b« fulfultd within 5 days next followine 
the day upon which thow duties arise. In eases of doubt, legal advice should b< taksa. • 5 
If any of your intcrssts in the relevant share capital of the listed company are held as a result of a section 9 acquisition a<"-mem then 
you ar= advised to taks lepl advice as no standard noticc form is provided by the Securities and Futures Ccrr二ission fot^the ourooses of 
disclosur:. r ^ 
I f y ° u h a v e inefficient spacs, complets your disclosures on a separata sheet 一 a photocopy of an uncomciet-i paz- 2 cou'd be us— 
provided that it is signed ar.d clearly marked "Additional Shcst". ‘ “ 
When completing this notice form u m block letters, preferably typewritten.. 
In cases of ambiguity staff of the SEHK may telephone you for clarification. 
^ y q u e r i « J b c u t the Ordinance or your obligations thereunder you should consult your lcgil or ether professional adviser 
Tlw fact that you do not have aJI the information required by the notics form should not prsvent you fra.-n filing the noticc form if you ar-
a w a r c y ° u 识 u n d c r a to disclose. Information not currently available should be provided when it becorr« available. " 
' I0U ？收？们” ¢0^ -^如 entire form, particularly paragraph 5. even if you arc only supplying dcaih rtcuirtd bv scction 7(6) and thers has been no dtsclosable change in the sizs of your interests. ‘ 
FILING REQUIREMENTS � . 
A signed copy of this node: form must be filed with the SEHK using one of the following methods:— 
By Post — The SDI Unit 
Compliancs Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
G.P.O. Bos 10C23 “ 
Hong Kong , . 
This a dedica^d P.O. Box for the SDI Unit onJy. You should not use the gsncral SEHK P.O. Ecx. 
By Hand 一 The SDI Unit 
Cotnpliasc: Divisjon . 
-The Stock Exdaage of Hong Kong Ltd. 
- T o w e r I & n . Exchange Squar: 
.Csatral . Hoag Kong 
By Fxx — Fax No.: 845C23 
Fcr lenity rasons. no wher SEHK f« number should b« used. You are ukrd to pay ptniufar acsntion to ensurinz the 
proper o x b u s d c t i s used. & 
Tric^fccrx cessations of feu notification can be obtained from 5233799. You arc asked ^  •二 use of this scrvic- to sigmncint cr pner sensitive noiirlcatioos. 
A signed cccy of this ncucr fcrm must also be filed with the company refcrrrd to a: pongrach I of enc acucr fbra ac iu r^ 'st-r^  otfic-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLETING THE NOTICE FORM : • 
The box marked "Ref. No .” can be used for your own record purposes. 
1 Paragraph 1 
Complete the name of the company and its stock code. The stock code can be obtained from the SEHK or from the company 
; c o n c c n w d . Even if the stock code is not known the notice form should still be completed and filed. 
2. Paragraph 2 
Describe the relevant share capital to which the notification relates. A small number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong have two classes of share capital, each with voting rights (i.e. " A " and "B" shares). If you are a substantial 
shareholder of both classes of share capital then you should complete two separate notices. 
3. Paragraph 3 
Complete your name and address. 
f n ^ r t w lo disclose the reason for disclosure at 4(b), tick the box number corresponding to one or more of the following 
reasons. For example, if you acquire shares which increase the notifiable percentage level then you would tick the boxes 
numbered "1'* and " 3 " . If your acquisition is as a result of a family member acquiring shares you would tick the boxes 
numbered "1" , " 3 " and "A". 
You should note that if you. tick the box numbered " 8 " then, apart from signing, you do not need to complete the remainder of 
the nodce form. 
Reason for disclosure 
~ Box Number 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital of listed company giving rise to a duty to disclose. “ 1 " ^ ( 
， _ Initial disclosure “ 2 
Change in percentage level of notifiable interest 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a family member (i.e. spouse or children under 18) " 4 " 
• Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a corporation subject to section 8(2), (3) and (4). " 5 " 
(sec note 1) 
Disclosure of particulars required by scction 7(6) (see note 2) " 6 " 
Change in particulars required by scction 7(6) (see note 2) " 7 ” 
Cease to have notifiable interest “ 8 " 
Note I: 
Section 8(2), (3) and (4) deems you to be interested in shares in the relevant share capital of a listed company that are held by 
a corporation the directors of which are accustomed to act in accordance with your dircracns or in which you can cxcrcise one- • 
third or more of the voting rights. 
！ Note 2: . • 
: The particulars required by scction 7(6) of the Ordinance arc the names of and the number of shares held by the registered 
shareholders. 广 . 
I ( 
5. Paragraph 5 # 
. / ••••, Disdosc all the shares that you arc interested in, including those that you are. deemed to be interested in as a result of section 8 
: - . ( i . e . family and corporate interests). If this is an initial disclosure paragraph 5(b) is not applicable. 
6. Paragraph 6 
You should disclosc the name of the person or company with whom you have a joint interest in shares. You should note that 
the Ordinance requires that the person or company with whom you have the joint interest has to make separate disclosures of 
their own if they have a notifiable interest. 
7. Paragraph 7 
You should disclose the interests held by your family members. This is so that the company conccrncd and the SEHK can 
distinguish between the shares that you hold absolutely and those that you arc deemed to bold as a result of your family 
relationship. The family mcmbcr/s concerned will have to make a separate disclosure if the shares they hold or are deemed to 
hold exceed the notifiable percentage. 
8. Paragraph 8* 
Disclose the interest in relevant share capital that you arc deemed to hold through other corporations pursuant to scction 8 of 
the Ordinance, If you have any doubts about the consequences of section 8 of the Ordicaacs legal advice should be taken. If 
these corporations* interests exceed the notifiable percentage they will have to make separate disclosures. There is a separate 
notice form for corporate disclosures. 
9. Paragraph 9 
The Ordinance requires you to disclose the names and addresses of the registered shareholder of the shareholding in the listed 
company disclosed at paragraph 5(a). If you do not have these particxilars this should a x prrvent you from filing your 
notification. These particulars can be sent to the SEHK and the company conccrncd when ycti obtain them. 
YOU SHOULD CHECK THE NOTICE FORM BEFORE SIGNING IT TO ‘\1AXH SURE THAT EVERYTHING THAT YOU HAVE 
STATED IS CORRECT. 
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APPENDIX 3 
DIRECTORS AND CHIEF EXECUTIVES NOTICE 
DISCLOSURE OF INTEREST ‘ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
No statutory form has been prescribed under the Ordinance. This notice form is provided for your ust by the 
Securities and Futures Commission. “ 
You should, however, note that your statutory obligations are determined by the Ordinance not by the notice form 
provided. When making your disclosure, therefore, you must satisfy yourself as to the rcquirerneais of the 
Ordinance and, if in doubt, you should seek appropriate legal advice. You are fret to make the required disclosures 
in some other written form. 
EXPLANATORY NOTE FOR DIRECTORS AND CHIEF EXECUTIVES ON COMPLETING THIS NOTICE FORM 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Rsferences to the Ordinance are references to the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Cap. 396). 
This notice form Is to be completed by directors, chief executives and shadow direaorj of a listed company whea disclosing all their 
incerests in the securicies of their company and its associated companies. It is also to be us^d by directors ctc. whea disclosing a notifiable 
interest in relevant share capital (i.e« 10% or more of the voting shares) for the purposes of Part II of (he Onliniact. 
The term ••substantial shareholder" b no( defined in the Ordinance but is used in this node; form and these occc$ fcr descriptive purposes 
only. A substantial shareholder U somcoflc who has an incertst in 10% or more of the relevant share capital ccnctrr^ed (i.e. voting jharcs 
of the company). ' 
For record purposes it u advisable to k « p a copy of all disclosures that are made. 
If any of your incerests in the relevant share capital of the listed company are held as a rtsult of a scctlon 9 acquisi'ica agreement then 
you are advised to take legal advice zs no standard nocice form h provided by the Sccuritics and Futures Ccrnnussicn for the purposes of 
disclosure. • 
If you have insufficient space, complete your disclosures on a separate sheet • a photocopy of an uncompleted pajt 2 could be used 
provided that it is signed and clcariy marked “Additional S h « t " . 
When completing thii noticc form use block letters, preferably typewritten. 
In eases of ambiguity suff of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (the •SEHK.) may telephone you for clan Reader.. 
If you have any queries about the Ordinance or your obligations thereunder you should coruult your legal or c<hcr professional adviser. 
The fact that you do not have all the information required by the nodes form should ncc prevent you from fiiir^ t rxcic: f o m if you are 
awart you arc under a duty to disclose. Information not currcndy available should be provided when it roilablc. 
You mu5t always complete the cncire form, particularly paragraph 10, even if you are or.Iv supplying dcails rtcvLtd by sccuon 7(6) and 
thcrs has been no disclcsablc changt in the size of your interests. 
FILING REQU1REMZNTS 
A signed copy of this nccic: form tr.us; be filed with the SEHK using one of the foilowip.g, methods:— 
By Post 一 The SDI Unir 
Compliance Division 
The Stock Eichangt of Hong Kong Ltd. 
G.P.O. Box 10023 ^ 
Hong Kong 
This is dedicated P.O. Box for the SDI Unit only. You should rwt use the gtr.cn! SHHX P.O. Hex. 
By Hand 一 The SDI Unit 
CompiiaiKt Divuion 
The Stock Exchange of Kong Kong Ltd. 
Tower I <Sc Q« Exchange Square 
Central, Hong Kong 
By Fix 一 Fix No.: 8456323 
. F o r sccirir/ msoos , no ochcr SEHK fax number should be used. You art aslcrd to pay pzrdadzr zrrzzcn to ensuring the 
proper Ux number is used. 
Telephone ccofinnationj of fax notification can be obolned from 5233799. Ycu art asked to r t s r i : =¾ zt this scrvx: to 
significant or prict sensitive Rocificauons. 
A signed copy of this accic: form must tIsq be filed with the company rcfcrrrd to at 2 of the ooccs fcm iz its rcgis^rrd office 
or principal placs of business in Hong Koag. You should caks every reasonably pncdcablt « 3 to ensurt thi: form rachcs the 
SEHK fin•- ^ 
Ycu have five days BCX: following the day the duty to disclosc arose to comply with the Oriiaaacs. 
INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLETING THS NOTICE FORM 
The box marked "Rrf. N � • ” can be used for jrour own record purposes. 
1. Paragrich ！ 
Thu 仰 r r e a i is rcquirtd by sccuow 15(2) ind 23(6) of the Ordinance. 
2. P i n g n c h 2 
You sncuii fill in inc fall rums cf the ccnipany of which you ar: a dirsctcr cr zzzz: exreutivs asc r s s=xx ccds. if ycu hav? it. 
3 Pira2ragr. 3 
You snouic icssi ify younci： by giving your full tt^r.c. 
A ccnac : tsiccftonc numecr J ^ c i d be proviccti so L ^ : the S三H:< can quiciS c^r.fy any nutrrr i r ^ t of any cr" l-.c 
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4. Paragraph 4 
, If you arc a substantial shareholder you should also complete, as appropriate, paragraphs 5, 6. 7. 8 and 9. Relevant share 
capital is defined in the Ordinance and means a listed company's share capital carrying the right to vote. 
5. Paragraph S 
Complete this paragraph only if you arc a substantial shareholder. 
In order to disclose the reason for disclosure at 5(b) , tick the box number corresponding to one or more of the following 
reasons. For example if you acquire shares which increase the notifiable percentage level then you would tick the boxes 
numbered “ I " and “3" . If your acquisition is as a result of a family member acquiring shares you would tick the boxes 
numbered “1”，“3" and “ 4 " . 
You should note that if you tick the box numbered “ 8 " then you can proceed to paragraph 10 of the form. 
Reason for disclosure Box Number 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital of listed company giving rise to a duty to disclose. “ 1 " 
Initial disclosure “ 2 " 
Change in percentage level of notifiable interest “ 3 " 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a family member (i.e. spou^ or children under 18) “ 4 " 
Acquisition/disposal of an interest in relevant share capital by a corporation subject to section 8(2), (3) and (4) “ 5 " 
(see noe 1) 
Disclosure of particulars required by section 7(6) (see note 2) " 6 " 
Change in particulars required by scction 7(6) (see note 2) “ 7 " 
Cease to have notifiable interest - “ 8 " 
Note 1: 
Section 8(2), (3) and (4) deems you to be interested in shares in the relevant share capital of a listed company that are held by 
a corporadon the directors of which arc accustomed to act in accordance with your directions or in which you can cxcrcisc onc-
third or more of the voting rights. 
Note 2: 
The particulars required by section 7(6) of the Ordinance are the names of and the number of shares held by the registered 
shareholders. 
6. Paragraph 6 
• You should disclose the name of the person or company with whom you have a joint interest in shares. You should note that 
the person or company with whom you have the joint interest has to make separate disclosures of their own if they have a 
notifiable interest. 
7. Paragraph 7 
You should disclose the interests held by your family members. This is so that the company concerned and the SEHK can 
distinguish between the shares that you hold absolutely and those that you arc deemed to hold as a result of your family 
relationship. Tnc family mcmbcr/s concerned will have to make a separate disclosure if the shares they hold or arc deemed to 
hold exceed the notifiable pcrccntagc (i .e.10%). 
8. Paragraph 8 ,, 
Disclose your interest in relevant share capital held through other corporations pursuant to section 8 of the Ordinance. If you 
have any doubu about the consequences of section 8 of the Ordinance you should consult your legal adviser. If these 
corporations' interests exceed the notifiable percentage of 10% they will have to file separate disclosures. 
9. Paragraph 9 
The Ordinance requires you to disclose the names and addresses of the registered shareholders of the relevant share capital in 
which you arc interested i.e. the names and addresses of those that hold the voting sharts in the listed company disclosed at 
paragraph 10. If you do not have these particulars this should not prevent you from filing your notification. These particulars 
can be scst to the SEHK and the company conccrncd when you obtain them. 
10. Paragraph 10 
You must disclosc all your interests in securities o f the listed company and its associated corporations. If you are a substantial 
shareholder it is here that you disclose the size of chat interest. You are referred to the Schedule to the Ordinance and section 
28, particularly. If you have any doubt as to what interests have to be disclosed you should consult your legal adviser, 
immediately. Section 31(1) states that a director or chief cxccutivc is taken to be interested in the shares or debentures in which 
� his spouse or child under 18 years of age is interested if they are not themselves a director or chief executive. You should 
disclose those interests in this paragraph. 
In column 10(A) provide the name of the corporation in which the interest subsists. 
In column 10(B) give a description of the class of securities in which you arc interested e.g. “1992 10% debentures'*. 
Columns 10(C) and (D) are self-explanatory. 
In column 10(E) you do not have to disclose what type of transaction was involved but you should provide the date and the 
consideration per unit. 
11. Paragraph 11 
From lime to umc the listed company of which you arc a director or chief executive may grant you rights to subscribe for 
securities. Ecually# associated corporations of the listed company may grant you rights to subscribe for securities. Paragraph 11 
is to be used to disclosc these interests. Part Q of the Schedule to the Ordinance sets down the information that has to be 
disclosed in this paragraph. Section 31(3) requires directors and chief executives to disdose the grant by the company of a right 
to subscribe for shares in the company to their spouse or child under 18 years of age. You should disclose these matters in this 
paragraph. 
This paragraph also allows you to disclose details of when you cxcrcise or assign rights 10 subscribe. This information is 
required by Pan III of the Schedule. 
YOU SHOULD CHECK THE NOTICE FORM BEFORE SIGNING IT TO ‘\1AXH SURE THAT EVERYTHING T H A T YOU HAVE 
STATED IS CORRECT. 
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APPENDIX 4 
COMPARISON OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN HONG KONG AND 
SINGAPORE 
Hong Kong Singapore 
Regulations Securities (Disclosure of Companies Act 
Interests) Ordinance Corporate Disclosure 
Policy 
What securities is concerned? listed listed and unlisted 
When disclosure is required? 
Shareholding more than 10% 5% 
Change in interests more than same percentage any change 
Agreement to buy shares of a Z x 
company 
Who should disclose? 
Substantial Shareholders ^ ^ 
Substantial Shareholders, Family ^ x 
Directors & Chief Executives ^ 
Directors & Chief Executives' ^ ^ 
Family 
A company that controls > 1/3 voting 
right of another company ^ x . 
To whom it should be disclosed? 
The company ^ 
The Stock Exchange ^ ^ listed company only 
Banking Regulator ^ bank only �. x 
When disclosure should be completed? 
Substantial Shareholder 5 days 2 days 
Directors & Chief Executives 5 days 24 hours 
Should the company keep a register for ^ 
public inspection? 
Failure to provide information 
Maximum Penalty HK$ 100,000 & S$5,000 and SS500 per 
imprisonment for 2 years day if offence persists 
Restrictioii order on shares ^ 
Company Investigation 
on shareholding ^ ^ 
on ultimate beneficial owner x ^ 
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APPENDIX 4 
PROPOSED INITIAL SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDER NOTICE 
Please refer to the General Notes for general guidance. For completion of specific items, please refer to the Specific 
Notes. References to Specific Notes are marked fSNft J for ease of reference. 
To : Listed Company name : Stock Code : 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited 
From : Substantial Shareholder [SSI] 
English & Chinese name (surname first): 
Address : 
Contact no: HKID/Passport No. 
Additional information requiredfrom corporate Substantial Shareholder: 
Business registration no. : Place of Incorporation : 
Registered office : 
Principal place of business : 
Person to whom enquiries can be directed : Contact no. : 
Listing status: (a) • listed on SEHK or other recognised exchange(s) (b) • listed on other exchange(s) 
(c) • Not listed (If (a) applies, go to Paragraph J; if (b) or (c) applies, complete the folloMing.) 
Issued share capital: 
Is any of the Substantial Shareholder's shareholder a director of the Listed Company: G Yes • No 
If yes, state name(s) of the director shareholders) and his shareholding in the Substantial Shareholder: 
State name and address of person(s) holding 10% or more of the Substantial Shareholder's issued shares and/or 
persons in accordance with whose directions the Substantial Shareholder or its directors are used to act: 
* 
Name Address % of shares held 
1. The Notifiable Interest /SS2I 
Notice is given that the Substantial Shareholder has on 
(the u Relevant Date") an interest in shares representing 
% of the issued share capita] of the Listed Company (the “Notifiable Interesf ) In 
calculating this interest, the issued share capital of the Listed Company is taken to be 
divided into shares of nominal value each. 
2. Particulars of the Notifuibk Interest 
(i) Class of issued/unissued• share capital to which the Notifiable Interest relates: fs\3j 
.78 
(ii) Number of shares in the Notifiable Interest that are held through derivatives or the interest of which are 
derived from derivatives: [SN4] ； 
(iii) Circumstances) under which the dirty of disclosure arose (tick the relevant box(es)): 
• acquisition made on-exchange/53V57 
• acquisition, made off-exchange 
• acquisition by way of 碑 
• by being a trustee (other than a bare trustee) 
• by being a bare trustee or a nominee of another person 
• by being a beneficiary of a trust other than a discretionary trust 
• by enforcement or exercise of security 
• through a rights issue 
• through a scrip dividend issue 
口 through share repurchases made by the Listed Company 
• due to family interest being attributed to Substantial Shareholder under Section [•] 
• due to corporate interest being attributed to Substantial Shareholder under Section [•] 
• by being a party to an agreement to acquire interest in the Listed Company as mentioned in 
Section [•] 
• by being a controlling shareholder providing cash or other consideration to facilitate 
acquisition of shares by another person as mentioned in Section [•] 
• by being a settlor of a discretionary trust [SN6] 
• Others (please specify) 
(iv) The capacity in which the Notifiable Interest is held by the Substantial Shareholder: (please complete 
the relevant part(s)) [SN6J 
Nature o f interest No. of shares concerned 
(a) as the beneficial owner 
(b) as the legal or registered owner 
(c) as a trustee (other than a bare trustee) 
(d) as a bare trustee or a nominee of another person . 
(e) as a beneficiary of a trust not being a discretionary trust 
(f) family interest being attributed to Substantial Shareholder 
under Section [•] 
(g) corporate interest being attributed to Substantial Shareholder 
under Section [•] 
(h) as a party to an agreement to acquire interest in the Listed 
Company as mentioned in Section [•] ,, 
(i) as a controlling shareholder providing cash or other consideration 
to facilitate acquisition of shares by another person as mentioned 
in Section [•] 
(j) as a settlor of a discretionary trust 
(k) others (please specify) 
3. Consideration 
(i) Please specify the consideration for the Notifiable Interest or any part of that Interest in Table (a) and/or 
(b) below. (If any part of the Notifiable Interest arose or was acquired, before the Relevant Date, 
include information up to four months before the Relevant Date). 
(a) Regarding interests in shares other than interests held through derivatives (if any): 
Acquisition Date/ On-exchange (state Off- no. of shares Highest price Average non-cash 
Date interest arose name of exchange ) exchange price consideration 
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(b) Regarding interests in shares held through derivatives (if any): 
Acquisition On-exchange (state Off- Description of No. of units of Highest Average non-cash 
Date/Date name of exchange) exch. derivatives (include derivatives price price consider-
interest arose stock code, if any) ation 
(ii) For off-exchange transactions disclosed above, please attach to this Form copies of contracts, 
agreements, scheme or understanding pursuant to which the Notifiable Interest arose. If there are no 
such written documents, please attach to this Form a memorandum specifying the material terms of any 
contracts, agreement, scheme, arrangement or understanding pursuant to which the Notifiable Interest 
arose. If any part of the Notifiable Interest arose or was acquired before the Relevant Date, include 
information up to four months before the Relevant Date. [SN7] 
4. Additional Information on Interest held through Derivatives 
If Paragraph 2(ii) applies, please indicate the capacity in which the derivatives are held by the Substantial 
Shareholder: (please complete the relevant part(s)) [SN8] 
Nature of interest No. of shares concerned 
(a) as writer of call option on issued shares 
(b) as holder of call option on issued shares...”,”"....”.”. 
(c) as writer of put option on issued shares 
(d) as holder of put option on issued shares 
(e) as holder of derivative call warrants 
(f) as issuer of derivative call warrants 
(g) as holder of derivative put warrants 
(h) as issuer of derivative put warrants . 
(i) as holder of convertible securities 
(j) as holder of subscription warrants 
(k) long of stock futures 
(1) short of stock futures 
(m) others (please specify) 
5. Additional Information in relation to Family Interest 
If Paragraph 2(iv)(f) applies, please provide information oil the spouse and/or children under 18 whose interest in 
shares in the Listed Company is attributed to the Substantial Shareholder: 
Name Address Number of shares 
.80 
6. Additional Information in relation to Corporate Interest 
If Paragraph 2(iv)(g) applies, please provide information on the corporation(s) whose interest in shares in the 
Listed Company is attributed to the Substantial Shareholder: 
Name Address Number of shares 
7. Additional Information with respect to Interest being held Jointly 
If the Substantial Shareholder holds any part of the Notifiable Interest jointly with any other person(s), please 
provide information on the other joint holders and their interest in shares in the Listed Company: 
Name Address Number of shares 
8. Additional Information from Trustee of a Discretionary Trust 
If the Substantial Shareholder holds any part of the Notifiable Interest as a trustee of a discretionary trust, please 
provide information on the trust and settlor(s) of the trust: [SN9] 
Name of the trust No. of shares held by the trust Name and address of settlor —_ 
9. Additional Information from a Party to an Agreement under Section�.1 
(i) If Paragraph 2(iv)(h) or (i) applies, please provide information on the other parties to the agreement: 
Name Address 
(ii) Please attach to this Form a copy of the relevant agreement. If there is no written agreement, please 




I/We declare that, to the best of my/our knowledge and belief, the information contained in this notice is true and 
accurate. *The number of pages that are annexed to this notice is . 
*17We of 
am/are giving this notice *on 
my/our own behalf. / as the agent of and hereby 
confirm and represent that I/we have been duly authorised to give this notice. 
Dated this day of 
[In the case of a notice given by an individual:] 
[Usual Signature] 
[Full name] 
[HKID or Passport No’] 
[In the case of a notice given by a body corporate :] 
This notice is given on behalf of [Name of body \ 
corporate] by [Name of person signing the I 
notice], [position], who is duly authorised by the board of directors to 
give this notice. 
[Usual Signature] 
[Full name] 
[HKID. or Passport No.] 
* Delete as appropriate 
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General Notes 
1. This Form 2 is to be used by a person (individual or corporation) who, after [•]，becomes interested in 5% or 
more of the issued share capital for the time being of a Hong Kong listed company. Please use Form 1 if a 
person is interested in 5% or more of the issued share capital of a Hong Kong listed company as at [ •]; Form 3 
if a person ’s notifiable interest changes by one percentage level; and Form 4 if a person ceases to have an 
interest in 5% or more of the issued share capital of a listed company. 
2. References to "Ordinance ” is to [Part [•] of the Securities and Futures Ordinance][the Securities (Disclosure 
of Interests) Ordinance] (Chapter [•] of the Laws of Hong Kong); references to "Section ” are to sections of the 
Ordinance; and references to "Paragraph ” are to paragraphs of this Form. 
3. The term "Substantial Shareholder" is not defined in the Ordinance but is used in this Form and these General 
and Specific Notes for descriptive purposes only. A substantial shareholder is a person who has an interest in 
5% or more of the issued share capital of the listed company named in the Form. 
4. When making disclosure under this Form, please satisfy yourself on the requirements of the Ordinance, and if 
in doubt, please seek appropriate legal advice. These General Notes and the Specific Notes are for guidance 
only. 
5. Please use block letters (preferably type-written) when completing this Form. If there is insufficient space, 
please complete your disclosures on separate sheets. Additional sheets must be securely annexed to this Form, 
clearly marked as "Additional Sheet” cmd signed by or on behalf of the Substantial Shareholder. Please detach 
these Notes from the Form prior to submitting it to the listed company cmd the SEHK. 
6.. A signed copy of this Form must be filed with the listed company at its registered office or principal place of 
business in Hong Kong. A separate signed copy of this Form must also be filed with The Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong Limited (“SEHK’’) using one of the following methods: 
By Post - By Hand -
The SDI Unit The SDI Unit 
Regulation Division Regulation Division 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
G.P.O. Box 10023 Tower I & II，Exchange Square 
Hong Kong] Central, Hong Kong , ! 
By Fax - Fax No. f •] 
7. The G.P.O. Box set out above is a dedicated P.O. Box for use by the SDI Unit only. Please do not use the 
general SEHK P.O. Box. For security reasons, no other SEHK fax number should be used. Telephone 
confirmations offax notification can be obtained from [ •]. Please restrict use of this service to significant or 
price sensitive notifications. 
8. Steps should be taken to ensure that a signed copy of this Form reaches the SEHK at the same time as, or 
immediately after, a similar copy reaches the listed company. A duty of disclosure must be performed within 2 
business days next following the day on which the duty arises. 
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Specific Notes 
1. Notes on "Substantial Shareholder" 
Information on the Substantial Shareholder and Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 10 must be completed in each case. 
Whether Paragraphs 4 to 9 need to be completed depends on the circumstances of each case. 
The section on "Substantial Shareholder" should contain details of the Substantial Shareholder - the person 
performing a duty of disclosure. This Form may be completed and issued on behalf of a Substantial 
Shareholder by its duly authorised agent. In such circumstances, the name and details of the agent must also be 
provided in Paragraph 10. The Substantial Shareholder remains primarily responsible for the information 
provided 
Notification on a group basis (e.g. on behalf of a corporate group or members of the scone family) can be made 
by using this Form. If notification is given on such basis, all the persons having a duty of disclosure (each 
being a Substantial Shareholder) must be clearly identified. Details of all such persons and their Notifable 
Interest as required in this Form must be disclosed in a clear and orderly manner to ensure clarity and 
facilitate public dissemination of disclosed information by the SEHK. If appropriate, a corporate or family 
chart may be annexed showing how each Substantial Shareholder is interested in the interest being disclosed, 
and their relationship with respect to each other. 
2. Note to Paragraph 1 
The Relevant Date refers to the date on which the duty of disclosure arises. If the Substantial Shareholder has 
or is deemed to have an interest in unissued shares through derivatives, such shares should be taken into 
account in determining the amount and percentage of the Notifiable Interest. Reference to the "issued share 
capital" of the Listed Company means the total nominal value of the issued share capital of the Company as at 
the Relevant Date. 
3. Note to Paragraph 20) 
If any part of the Notifiable Interest relates to both the issued and unissued shares of the Listed Company, 
please specify the class of share capital to which the issued and unissued shares relate. 
4. Note to Paragraph 2(ii) 
If any part of the Notifiable Interest consists of interest in shares held through or derived from derivatives, 
disclose the number of underlying shares to which the derivatives relate. If Paragraph 2(H) applies to the 
Substantial Shareholder, Paragraph 3(i)(b) and 4 must be completed. 
5. On-exchange -v- off-exchange acquisitions 
An acquisition is made "on-exchange “ when the transaction took place in the ordinary course of trading of a 
stock market of a recognised stock exchange or of a futures market of a recognised futures exchange. The 
reverse applies to an "off-exchange ” acquisition. "Ordinary course of trading" in this context, does not include 
transactions carried out as a "cross" or "special". 
6. Note to Paragraph 2(tv) 
If the Substantial Shareholder holds the Notifiable Interest in more than one capacity, please specify the nature 
of his interest and indicate the number of shares to which the nature of interest relates. 
7. Notes to Paragraph 4(e) and 9(H) 
If a memorandum is attached specifying the material terms of any agreement, arrangement or understanding, 
the material terms should include the name and address of the parties to the agreement, arrangement or 
understanding. In the case of unlisted derivatives, principal terms such as exercise or conversion price, 
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expiration date and exercise period should be disclosed. The memorandum must be certified as the true copy of 
the original by the Substantial Shareholder or the duly authorised agent responsible for filing this Form. 
8. Notes to Paragraph 4(i) 
If derivatives are held by the Substantial Shareholder in more than one capacity, please specify the nature of 
his interest and indicate the number of underlying shares to which the nature of interest relates. 
9. "Settlor" of a discretionary trust 
The term "settlor" is defined in the Ordinance. 
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APPENDIX 4 
SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION CONCLUSION OF PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE SECURITIES (DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS) ORDINANCE 
The principal conclusions reached by the SFC regarding the 12 specific areas of 
consultation contained in the Consultation Paper are summarised as follows: 
(1) Disclosure threshold : Reduce the initial substantial shareholding disclosure 
threshold from 10% to 5% (pages 13 to 15). No change is made to the original 
proposals set out in the Consultation Paper. 
(2) Notification Period: Shorten the disclosure notification period from five days 
to three business days (pages 15 to 18). It was originally suggested that the 
notification period should be reduced to two business days. 
(3) Timing of Notification to the Stock Exchange and listed companies : 
Remove the requirement that notification of an interest in shares must be 
made to the Stock Exchange {<(SEHK") prior to notifying the listed company 
concerned (pages 18 and 19). No change is made to the original proposal. 
(4) De minimis change exemption : Exempt substantial shareholders from the 
obligation of disclosure when their interests in shares fluctuate by a de 
minimis amount across a particular percentage level (pages 19 and 20). No 
change is made to the original proposal contained in the Consultation Paper. 
(5) Details of registered shareholders : Remove the existing provisions requiring 
substantial shareholders to disclose the particulars and shareholdings of 
registered holders, and to disclose any change in their particulars (pages 20 
and 21). No change is made to the original proposal. 
(6) Consideration and terms of agreements : Substantial shareholders will be 
required to disclose the consideration payable or receivable by them in 
acquiring or disposing of interests in shares, whether the transactions take 
place on-exchange or off-exchange. It is, however, not necessary to disclose 
consideration in relation to dealings in derivatives as originally proposed (see 
paragraph (ll)(g) below). Further, there is no need for substantial 
shareholders and directors to disclose agreements or the terms of agreements 
relating to off-exchange transactions as suggested in tiie Consultation Paper 
(pages 21 to 24). 
(7) Disclosure of persons who control corporate substantial shareholders : 
When performing a duty of disclosure, an unlisted corporate substantial 
shareholder will be required to disclose the details of any person in 
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accordance with whose directions or instructions it or its directors are 
accustomed to act. The proposal that substantial shareholders should also 
disclose details on its shareholding structure and persons holding 10% or more 
shares in its issued share capital has been dropped (pages 25 and 26). 
(8) Discretionary trusts : When performing a duty of disclosure, a “settlor" of a 
discretionary trust will be deemed to be interested in the shares held by the 
trust and may, as a result, be under a separate duty of disclosure. A revised 
proposed definition of “settlor*, is included in this Paper. The proposal that 
trustees of discretionary trusts should be required to disclose the identity of 
settlor(s) of the trust has been dropped (pages 27 to 30). 
(9) “Concert party agreements，，: Extend the scope of a "concert party 
agreement” under section 9 of the Ordinance to include any arrangement 
under which a controlling shareholder of a listed company provides any loan 
or security to another person on the understanding, or with the knowledge, that 
the loan or security will be used or applied to facilitate the acquisition of an 
interest in shares of the same listed company by that other person (pages 30 
and 31). No change is made to the original proposal set out in the Consultation 
Paper. 
(10) Investment managers and trust companies l Remove the exemption 
currently made available to Hong Kong registered investment managers and 
trust companies under the Securities (Disclosure of Interests)(Exclusions) 
Regulations (pages 32 to 37). No change is made to the original proposal. 
(11) Derivatives: 
(a) Derivatives in respect of unissued shares: Extend the scope of 
derivative interests to cover those in respect of unissued shares (page 
38). — 
(b) Calculation of derivative interests: Use the last known total number of 
issued shares of a listed company as the denominator or the basis for 
calculating the percentage of derivative interests (page 39). 
(c) Short positions of derivatives: Require disclosure of short positions of 
derivatives (e.g. the writing of a call option and the holding of a put 
option (pages 39 and 40)). 
(d) Netdng-off between long and short positions: Netting-off between 
long and short positions of derivatives would not be allowed (pages 40 
and 41). 
(e) Stock futures and purely cash-settled derivatives-. Require disclosure 
of interests derived from stock futures and purely cash-settled 
derivatives (pages 41 to 43). 
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( f ) The three options relating to aggregation of interests. Adopt Option 3 
as set out in pages 46 and 47 of the Consultation Paper for the purpose 
of aggregating derivative interests (page 43). 
(g) Consideration and terms of agreements of derivatives transactions. 
The original proposal is changed so that an exemption will be created 
for derivatives transactions. The proposal would not require disclosure 
of the consideration, the strike price, the option premium or the option 
price of a derivative. However, it is still necessaiy to disclose the 
exercise period, the expiry date and the number of underlying shares in 
the notifiable interest that are held through derivatives or the interest 
of which is derived from derivatives (page 44). 
(h) Charges in the nature of an interest. Require disclosure of all 
changes in the nature of an interest in share, whether resulting from an 
exercise or expiry of a derivative or otherwise, even if the percentage 
of interest remains tinchanged (pages 44 and 45), 
Apart from paragraph (g) above, no changes are made to the original proposals 
regarding disclosure of derivatives, 
(12) Disclosure Forms : As mentioned in the Consultation Paper, new prescribed 
notification forms will be designed to enable substantial shareholders and 
directors to file their notifications systematically (pages 46 and 47). 
The Consultation Paper also invited the public to comment on two general issues: 
first, the disclosure of share pledges made by substantial shareholders in favour of 
their creditors; and secondly, the practical difficulties that the proposed changes may 
create for bona fide stock lending and borrowing activities. Having considered public 
views on these issues，the SFC has formulated its policies as summarised below. 
(13) Disclosure of pledges of shares : Under the existing Ordinance, substantial 
shareholders who pledge shares as security for loans are not required to 
disclose interests subject to the pledges unless they have defaulted on the 
loans, lenders have enforced the security under the pledges, and such actions 
have resulted in a change in the interest of substantial shareholders in a listed 
company. The SFC has considered the arguments for and against requiring 
substantial shareholders to disclose pledges of shares before the enforcement 
of security by lenders. On balance, the SFC does not consider that it is 
appropriate to impose such requirement. Reasons for this are set out in pages 
47 to 50 below. However, the SFC proposes that provisions should be 
included in the Ordinance clarifying the circumstances under which lenders 
would be regarded as having enforced security under share pledges. 
(14) Stock borrowing and lending: The current position under the Ordinance with 
respect to stock borrowers would remain the same, i.e. a stock borrower is 
regarded to have acquired an interest in the borrowed shares, and as a result, 
would need to disclose his interest as a substantial shareholder should his 
interest exceeds the disclosure threshold However, the proposal under 
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paragraph (ll)(h) above will affect the disclosure obligation of a stock lender. 
As the "loaned" shares are regarded as a disposal of interests by the lender 
with a right to call for delivery of the same number of shares, the share 
lending transaction will be regarded as a change in the nature of the interests 
and, disclosure is required accordingly (pages 51 and 52). 
Apart from the above, the SFC also wishes to raise the following points: 
(15) Clarification of the “bare trustee，，exemption: Whilst the SFC cannot give 
authoritative guidance on how the courts will interpret the Ordinance, in 
practice, the SFC would regard a "bare trustee ” as someone whose interest in 
shares is entirely “passive”’ i.e. a person who holds property in trust for the 
absolute benefit and at the absolute disposal of other persons, and who has no 
present beneficial interest in the property and no duties to perform in respect 
of it, except to convey or transfer it to persons entitled to hold it, or in 
accordance with such persons' directions. The exemption is accordingly, very 
narrow (page 35), 
(16) Disaggregation of group interests for investment managers, custodians and 
trustees: The SFC recognises that substantial shareholders whose interests in 
shares are derived from their business of managing the investments of other 
persons or safeguarding the assets belonging to other persons, should be 
treated differently from shareholders who control, or seek to influence the 
control of, interests in shares. Accordingly, the SFC proposes that where the 
organisational structure of a corporate group is such that the voting and 
investment powers over interests in shares held by a company which carries on 
the business of an investment manager, a custodian, or a trustee are exercised 
by it independently from its holding or related entities, then aggregation of 
interests held by such a company with those held by its holding or related 
entities is not required. The SFC suggests that the Ordinance should be 
amended to allow "disaggregation ” of group interests as mentioned above. 
This proposal is made with the view to reduce the compliance burden of 
corporate groups which have investment managers, custodians, and trustees 
(wherever incorporated or registered) within their structures (pages 35 and 
36). 
(17) Clarification on interests which subsist by virtue of any authorised unit 
trusts and mutual fund corporations: In view of the uncertainty regarding 
the scope of section 14(l)(b)(i) of the Ordinance, the SFC proposes that the 
Ordinance be amended to clarify that (i) interests held by a person as the 
trustee of a collective investment scheme authorised by the SFC will be 
disregarded for the purposes of disclosure; (ii) interests held by a holder of 
such a scheme will also be disregarded; and (iii) interests held by the fund 
manager or "operator" of such a scheme may be "disaggregated “ from those 
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APPENDIX 4 
INSIDER DEALING - WHEN IT TAKES PLACE IN HONG KONG? 
What is the s ecur i t i e s concern? 
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